The ISSUE

J. W. HEADLAM

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THE ISSUE

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BY

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"LIFE OF BISMARCK," "THE HISTORY
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Chapters I, II, III and IV of this book have already appeared in the *Nineteenth Century and After*. Chapter V is reprinted from the *Westminster Gazette*. I have to express my obligation to the Editors for permission to reprint them in the present form. They are reprinted almost without alteration, and I have not attempted to change them, even in those cases where what was written some months ago would now be expressed rather differently. The Introduction is new.

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THE ISSUE

INTRODUCTION

THE articles contained in this volume, which were written during the summer of the present year, contain an examination of some of the suggestions as to terms of peace which have from time to time appeared in Germany. I republish them, for they may be useful as helping to throw into a proper perspective the complaints that now come from Germany, that it is England, and England alone, which, by the immoderate nature of her demands, stands between Europe and the peace which all desire. It is well to probe the nature of the terms which many men in Germany would have proposed at a time when a decisive German victory still appeared probable. It is well that we should not forget these things, for there are still not only neutrals, but even Englishmen, who continue to talk as though the British Government had wantonly refused favourable offers of peace and reasonable terms of reconciliation which had been offered by the German Chancellor.

It would have been easy to increase the bulk of the book, by including in it selections from the press and from the pamphlets issued in such abundance by private individuals. I have deliberately refrained from doing so. Nothing is more pernicious than the modern habit of quoting freely in other countries the foolish and exaggerated utterances of obscure individuals and newspapers, or the noisy leaders of extreme factions, who are to be found in every country, and by transporting them across the frontier giving them an importance which no one at home would attribute to them. It is a habit to which even distinguished German historians have given their support, and we find the official spokesmen of the Government, and men such as Prince Bülow, quoting as evidence of English intentions the words of Englishmen which are treated at home with the neglect that they deserve. In this I do not propose to imitate them; I have endeavoured to confine myself to evidence as to what seems to be the considered opinion of the responsible Government, the leaders of parties, the corporate opinion of influential associations, or the writing of men who appear to carry real weight in Germany.

Some apology is necessary from anyone who at such a time says or does anything that may seem to tend to postpone the arrival of peace. No position is so contemptible as that of the man of letters who, from the security of his home, where he is himself free from danger and hardships, adds

to the spirit of national animosity which has already reached so lamentable a pitch, or contributes to the prolongation of the war, when he knows that by so doing he is helping to send thousands of men from every country in Europe to misery and death. It would to me be far more agreeable to join those who demand that the slaughter and destruction should now cease, and who ask with indignation what sound reason can be given for its continuance. But, in public as in private affairs he is not always the best peacemaker who refuses to recognise the existence of any real cause of difference. On the contrary, a clear recognition and definition of the matters at issue may often prove the best means towards reconciliation. And so I have attempted to put into the clearest light, using the evidence afforded by the statements of the Germans themselves, what is the real issue of the war, and the reason why the only suggestions as to peace which have come to us from Germany, with any claim to authority, are unacceptable.

I call this book *The Issue*. There have been in fact three great issues of the war, but it is on one of them alone, that which was the first and remains the last, that I wish to concentrate attention. The three issues were what we may call the Atlantic, the Eastern and the European. Of these, the first was in a way secondary, *i.e.* it did not arise from the origin of the war and the conflict with Russia, but was only brought into

prominence by the entry of England into the conflict. We can say with certainty that it had not been the intention of the German Government, and those who moved for war, to attempt to settle the issue with Great Britain before that with France and Russia had been decided. This we must remember; but there is also no doubt that in the German Nation itself this now holds the most prominent place. The overthrow of the British dominion at sea, the consequent dissolution of the British Empire, the transference of sea power from Great Britain to Germany, is that on which they have for many years set their heart, and which is now their avowed aim. It is an ambition which, as we may recognise, is natural enough, and I do not see that we have any ground for complaint if they chose to challenge us. Our Empire has been gained by war, and if it is attacked it must be maintained by war. The ambition, at least, was not necessarily an ignoble one; it sprang not merely from vulgar jealousy or from commercial competition; there was in it perhaps something of the great spirit of romance and adventure. The new Germany which has grown up during the last fifteen years has looked, as in the past many generations of Englishmen have looked, to the larger world beyond the seas. The forests of Africa called them and the Coral Islands of the Pacific, the romance of the East and the limitless expanses of the ocean summoned them to vistas and ambitions which had been

closed to their forefathers, shut up within the narrow limits of their petty states and tiny cities. They wished to be recognised in these distant lands, not only as settlers, traders and explorers, but as members of a great imperial race, as conquerors, rulers and administrators. It was a great ambition natural to a nation looking upon the world full of the longing for great deeds, desirous to take their place in the secular succession of great empires, desirous that Germany and a German ruler should be one of the series whose names are irrevocably written upon the chronicle of the ages, wishful to emulate the deeds if not of Alexander and of Cæsar, at least of Alaric and of Attila. There is an immortality awarded to destruction as well as to creation, and there was one thing alone that seemed worth doing, the overthrow of the British Empire. I say that it is not an ambition which we need grudge them; it sprang from their full knowledge of the greatness of the task. They saw that the British Empire was the only institution of the present day which seemed to challenge, in the greatness of its achievements and the magnificence of its ideals, the great empires of the past. We hold the challenge cup of the world, and it was by challenging us alone that they could become one of the great World Empires.

Such a challenge could not be refused. Nothing would be more lamentable than that the countrymen of Drake and Hawke and Nelson, of Clive

and Wolfe and Wellington, should shrink from it or fail in the courage and resolution to keep up by their own deeds what had been acquired by their fathers.

There were many among them who believed, and I suspect believed with regret, that no conflict would be necessary, that the British Empire would fall by the forces of decay which seemed to be eating away its very heart, as did the Empire of Spain; of this there was no doubt, and for thirty years there has been no doubt that the day would come that, if the British Empire did not fall to pieces of itself, the Germans would attempt to wrest from us the sovereignty of the seas.

This was their golden fleece. But the golden fleece was guarded by the dragon. They had no Medea to charm the dragon to sleep. They ploughed with their steeds and the armed men sprang up from the earth, but they had no magic to throw among them to make them turn their arms against one another.

In truth this branch of the war had been decided before the first shot was fired. It was decided fifteen years ago. A successful attack on England's maritime and naval position was only possible on the hypothesis, either that it was unexpected and unprepared for, and that the self-governing dominions would not support the mother country in the war, or that Germany had allies who could give her efficient help on sea as

well as on land. What danger there was from the first contingency had been removed owing to the extraordinary folly of the Emperor and Prince Bülow. They talked, they boasted, they swaggered and they bullied, but talk and boasting, swaggering and bullying are not the best preparations for victory. The issue was decided in the South African War, for in this it was shown that the enmity of Germany to this country was one which concerned not the British Isles alone, but the whole structure and coherence of the Empire. This gave a new purpose and conviction to the imperial naval strategy, and England was therefore not unprepared, for Great Britain became conscious that she was acting as the trustee, not for herself alone, but for all that was involved in the maintenance of the integrity of the Empire. The second danger was removed by the failure of German diplomacy, which brought it about that she entered on this war without allies (except Turkey) who could give her any effective assistance in the struggle with the British Empire.

The second issue is that which centres round Turkey. The instrument of it was German patronage of Mahomedanism. Based as it was on the perfidious intrigues carried on during the years of nominal peace, it is the greatest crime against European civilisation of which any state has yet been guilty, for it depended on the alliance between German and Turkish militarism, the

avowed object of which was to set up again Turkish rule in Egypt, and to use the wild passions of Islam for the overthrow of the civilising influence of Europe.

In this part of the war the decision has long been delayed. The issue in it will depend on that in the European war.

There remains the third and the great issue, that with which the war began, and with which it will close: the question of the predominance of Germany in Europe. In truth it includes the other two, for to a Germany predominant in Europe the conquest of the East would be open, and against a Germany which wielded the resources, military and material, of the whole of Central Europe, England would eventually be unable to hold her own. Let us therefore consider for a moment what is at stake in this matter.

The origin of the war and its object are identical; there has been no change in the views of Germany. What the issue was in August 1914, that it is now. If we look beyond the details of the discussions and the negotiations to the great issue, that is, as it always has been, simple enough, and there is I think no difference as to the facts between the two parties. The strongest accusation which is made against Germany by the Allies is in fact acknowledged and corroborated by German statesmen and German writers. The ultimate question is not whether Germany wished for war; it has

been contended by the Chancellor, and perhaps with truth, that he did all in his power to avoid war. It is a matter of faith among the German nation that the Emperor was in 1914, as always, peculiarly averse from war. Let us assume that these contentions are true. There still remains the undisputed fact that, though Germany may have wished to avoid war, the one condition on which she would preserve peace was that she should be allowed to dictate to the whole of Europe the conditions on which peace could be maintained. The real accusation against Germany is that she attempted to use the fear inspired by her great military power and her alliance with Austria-Hungary, to put herself in a position in which her preponderance over Europe would have been practically assured.

The general custom of Europe is that when a diplomatic question arises which affects Europe as a whole, and in particular when this is one in which there is a conflict of interests between two Great Powers, neither shall proceed to military action or take any irrevocable step without first consulting and informing the other Powers, her friends or allies (for in Europe all states are in principle friends or allies), and shall certainly not proceed to military action until every effort has been made by negotiation and conference to find a friendly settlement. The whole diplomatic history of Europe since 1815 is an illustration of this truth. If this rule were disregarded, it is

scarcely too much to say that there is not a year in which a great war would not have broken out. Now, in this case Germany and Austria deliberately, and on principle, violated this rule. They laid down the proposition that if Austria went to war with Serbia, it was a local matter in which the rest of Europe was not concerned. They knew, and it can be shown from their own statements that they knew, that this was a proposition which could not be willingly accepted by Russia, a proposition, that is, which could only be enforced either by the sword or by the threat of war. They knew that it raised in the acutest form fundamental questions of Russian interest. They knew that for more than 100 years it had been understood that if either Russia or Austria took took a step forward in the Balkans, they would at once meet the opposition of the other Power, and they knew that just because of this, either State, whenever it proposed to take action, had always consulted the other beforehand. This had again and again been done by Russia. The whole history of the negotiations preceding the Crimean war and of those preceding the Russo-Turkish war of 1877, illustrates this. On both occasions Russia had, by a preliminary understanding with Austria, to clear the way before she went to war with Turkey. If at that time Russia had brought military pressure to bear, either on Roumania or on Turkey, Austria must at once have protected her interests by mobilisa-

tion or by war, unless she had been consulted beforehand by Russia.

Now in this case Germany and Austria deliberately, as I have said, violated this rule; knowing as they did that the Austrian action raised in the acutest form fundamental questions of Russian interest, they claimed for Austria the right to take what action she chose, and laid down the cardinal principle that no other power was to be consulted; that is they eliminated Europe from a question in regard to which the whole of European diplomacy had been most concerned. It matters not in the least whether the Austrian demands were legitimate or not; what does matter is that if their action had been allowed to go forward unopposed, the principle would have been accepted that Germany and Austria were themselves the sole judges of their action on matters of general import, and they would have claimed and secured a privileged position, the result of which would have been that the rest of Europe would have had to remain impassive whenever German interests were involved.

It is this then which was the occasion of the war, and as it was the occasion, so the avowed object is that at the end Germany shall emerge with such increased strength that she can, with impunity, defy the united opinion of Europe.

This object will be attained of course if Germany is victorious, but it will also be attained if, as a

few writers in England and some among neutral countres suggest, the Allies acquiesce in a draw.

As to a complete victory of Germany, the results are so obvious that it is scarcely worth the labour to explain them. Moreover a complete victory such as they anticipated is now clearly out of the question. None the less, it may be worth while to give in a few words what the result of this would have been. It is desirable to do so because it is perhaps not easy for many to realise what would have been meant by it. We are so accustomed to the Europe which we know, to the Europe which consists of a number of independent states, differing indeed in power, but equal in dignity and each enjoying full and complete independence, that we are accustomed to think that this state of things, which has in fact existed for 400 years, must continue to exist for all time. And yet the history of the past tells us that great and fundamental changes have occurred and may occur again in future.

Now, a full German victory would undoubtedly have meant that in some form or other all the peoples inhabiting the central portion of the continent of Europe, the peoples we know as the Belgians, the Dutch, the Danes, the Poles and the Swiss, would have been brought into the German system. It would not have been in the least necessary that they should have been incorporated in the Empire. It is quite possible that they might have continued to exist as independent

autonomous states ruled over by families allied to the German princely houses; this is the way in which, as a matter of fact, great empires have been formed, whether by the Romans or by the English in India. The student of ancient history will remember for how long the republics of Greece and the dynasties of Asia continued to enjoy a nominal freedom, while they were in fact completely subject to the will of the Roman State, and we know how, at the present day, the Indian Princes are still recognised as sovereign rulers, though they are incapable of independent international action. Now a German victory would have meant that the central part of the continent of Europe, from the mouth of the Dniester to the English Channel, would have been brought into the same relation to Germany that the subject states were to Rome. There would have been no one who could have ventured to disobey the orders issued from Berlin.

An empire of this kind is of course not complete in a day; there would have been opposition, and we can be quite sure that a high-spirited race, such as the Magyars, would have been the first to rebel against a power which they themselves had helped to establish; the final subjugation of the Bohemians and the South Slavs would not have been completed without some further trouble; there would have been disturbances, perhaps serious disturbances, which could not have been put down without bloodshed. But these would

not have been so much wars as what the Romans called "tumultus"; they would have been akin to the Indian Mutiny or the Irish Rebellion of 1798, or the risings in Poland, and if there had been no foreign assistance to look to, however serious they were, the ultimate result would have been certain from the beginning. Nothing is rarer than a successful rebellion; revolutions seldom succeed unless they are helped by weakness in the governing authority, or by disaffection in the army. The history of the year 1848 in Austria and Germany, shows how helpless, even in the most favourable circumstances, is a popular rising, and if this was true even in the old days, how much more so will it be in the future, against a government which has the sole control of all the modern machinery of warfare.

Against a united Central Europe, the outlying states, France, Italy, Spain, Scandinavia, would be helpless, and a Europe so organised would be able so to strengthen and defend the frontiers that an attack even from Russia would be cause for little apprehension. In a Europe so organised wars would cease, and they would cease for the only reason which would ever stop them, the concentration of all military power in the hands of a single Government so powerful that her position is unassailable. Europe would have had the *Pax Germanica.*

The difficulty of visualising the results of such a growth of German power is that we are likely to

assume that men will continue to be governed by the beliefs and principles in which we ourselves have grown up. Among these the greatest is the pride in the freedom of one's country. But let us not deceive ourselves: had the Allies been defeated, had a Central Europe of this kind been established, this principle would not have survived; it would have lingered for one or two generations. Independence would have been the dream of romantic men of letters; it would have been like the traditional republicanism under the Roman Empire, or like that of independence among the Greek states after having been conquered by Macedonia; but as a real, active, strong, controlling political influence, it would have waned away and died; the results of the great war would be irremediable. King Albert and Joffre, and the Serbian peasants would in the history of the world have taken their places side by side with the other heroes of lost causes, with Sartorius and Demosthenes and Hannibal and Vercingetorix and Cato and Llewellyn and Schamyl and Krüger. But the world would have gone on, and generations would have arisen to whom political freedom would have been but a memory and a dream. The Gauls and the Greeks and the Sicilians and the Jews were conquered by Rome, and the time came when their chains ceased to gall them and they ceased to regret the uncertain days of the past. They had order, comfort, security, they had no more war; they had civilisation and per-

sonal freedom and religion, and they ceased to know that political freedom was no longer theirs.

And so it might be again, and so it would have been had Germany been successful in the war.

It is the attainment of this new Europe which is either expressly stated or implied in all the German suggestions for terms of peace analysed in this volume, whether given in the documents of the Six Associations, in the picture of Central Europe drawn for us by Naumann, or in the peace terms as stated by the Chancellor. For all have this in common, that they demand that Germany shall come out of the war so much stronger as to be able to maintain herself against the whole of Europe, and the Chancellor goes so far as to tell us in so many words that we must have a "new Europe, free from the trammels of the balance of power."

As against this programme an Englishman will be satisfied with the reasons for which he entered on the war and the objects with which he is continuing it. For these are not the selfish and exclusive domination of a single state or nation, however eminent in the arts of peace and war, but the free and equal progress of all together in a generous rivalry. For he knows that diversity is the condition of life, and rivalry and conflict the condition of progress. We want and we will have, neither for ourselves nor for others, this partition of the world into aggressive and military world states, least of all will we have Europe,

which is the home and still is the hope of civilisation and freedom, subjected to the deadening rule of a single power. We need feel no chagrin that we are fighting not to create something new, but to maintain the old, for we know what the world owes to the secular rivalry and juxtaposition of these free European races, France and Spain and Holland and Italy and Flanders.

For what is the meaning of the old Europe? At bottom it is the mutual respect for each other's individuality, the consciousness of the limits set by reciprocal obligations, the recognition that, if there are to be wars, their methods will be determined by common agreement, and that the victor will, in the enforcement of his will, have to be bound by the general will of the political community to which he belongs. This old Europe was founded on a conception of justice and reciprocity, and it is for this reason that Germany repudiates it, for she understands neither. Justice and reciprocity—which are in fact identical, for they mean that there shall be a measure to the exactions demanded by the strong from the weak, that as a state measures so it shall be meted to it again—they are the union of the weak against the strong, which is the only security against the tyrant state.

And when Bernard Shaw and Bethmann-Hollweg and Bertrand Russell tell us that we must be done with the doctrine of the Balance of Power, I can only marvel at the shallownesss and superficiality of a criticism which does not trouble to

look below the diplomatic formula for the permanent truth. A strange trio. The German I can understand; he, at least, would use his sophism as a bait to win the suffrages of the unwary, while Germany, as they sat talking and arguing, established the dominion which would indeed remove for all time the anarchy that they deplore and would bring peace to Europe, but would do so by subjecting all to a single will.

So much for a German victory. But it will be said that no one now fears this. The German plans are already doomed to frustration and their hopes to disappointment. They have not succeeded in conquering Europe and they will not. Everywhere they are on the defensive, and slowly they are being driven back. Why then, the conclusion is drawn, not stop the war at once? So far as the German Government is concerned, there can be no doubt that they would gladly welcome any terms of peace which would enable them to come before their people without a crushing and irremediable defeat. Is it necessary to go on? Admirable people in neutral countries, in America, in Holland and Scandinavia, are forming societies and publishing reviews with the object of contriving to end a war which, in their eyes, has ceased to have any definite object. They have found even in England some few who welcome these suggestions. It is said that Germany would be willing to evacuate Belgium and France, and if she has done this that is all

that we have to demand. They talk of the "suicide of Europe," but they do not see that the end of Europe would come not by the continuance of the war, but by a cessation before the ends had been completely attained.

The position is a plausible one, but let us look the facts clearly in the face. Supposing that peace were to be made now—peace made before the war had been fought to a conclusion, with Germany still untouched and the German armies unconquered—what would be the result? The German nation, recognising that they had not attained the ends which were attributed to them, would persist in denying that they ever had had these before them at the beginning of the war. It would continue to be asserted in Germany for all time that the war was in truth a defensive warfare, forced upon Germany by a hostile coalition framed for the express purpose of destroying the Empire and annihilating their power. In this war they had been faced by a coalition as great or greater than the final coalition before which Napoleon fell. Confronted by Russia, France and England, together with Italy, Belgium, Serbia, Montenegro and Roumania, they would boast, and justly boast, that they had held their own; Germany would have been unconquered and thereby shown to have been unconquerable. The Germans are more moved than we are by historical analogies; long before the war began they referred, almost with pleasurable anticipation, to the prospect of a

new Seven Years War, in which the Germany of Bismarck would have to fight against the whole of Europe, as the Prussia of Frederick had had to do. They recalled also the fact that, though Frederick was again and again defeated, he was never conquered, and that the power of resistance which Prussia showed was the basis on which two generations later Prussian expansion was built up. So they anticipated it would be again. The great coalition would be formed, and it was formed; Germany would meet undaunted millions of enemies, and she has done so; against the bulwark of German breasts the rage of the enemy was helpless. Peace would be made and Germany would emerge from the conflict, whatever her losses might have been, infinitely greater and stronger than she had entered it. She would have withstood the trial by fire and by sword, and withstood it successfully.

Germany would have withstood, and withstood successfully, the greatest coalition ever formed. They would have known that when another war broke out, they would enter on it relatively stronger than they had been before, and their enemies weaker. For, let there be no mistake about it—if the present coalition does not achieve complete and absolute success, it will never again be established. Supposing it came about that the Germans evacuated Belgium and France, not because they had been driven out, but only as the result of negotiations, and perhaps in return for the

restoration of some of the German Colonies, does anyone believe that on a future similar occasion Belgium or France would be in a position to defy Germany? It would be impossible for them to do so, depending upon the support of England. It would be clearly written in history that, after England had put forward efforts, far greater than anyone had thought to be possible, she had still failed. Belgium would still, as before, be subject at any moment to be overrun by the German armies, and the experience she had once endured would inevitably deter her from incurring a similar risk again. Would Holland, with the example of Belgium before her, ever venture seriously to oppose German demands? Would Switzerland? Would Denmark?

If peace were made by negotiation before Germany were defeated—it matters not what the terms of peace were—on the continent of Europe and within her own domain she would have gained the essential thing. Whatever were the fate of Austria, Germany would have an increase of her effective power, for no diplomatic arrangements could eventually prevent the practical absorption of Austria by Germany. This alliance would continue, but does anyone believe that the alliance of England and of France, of Italy and of Russia could permanently be continued in the form of effective military and economic co-operation?

A drawn war would therefore be a victory for

Germany. It would be a victory for Germany as complete as was the second Punic war for Rome, and Germany in the future would be able to consolidate her position upon the Continent and prepare for the next war, which so many German writers are now anticipating, a war which would be directed against England, but one in which England would not be able to depend upon the help of her present Allies. And the next war would be one in which even though Holland and Belgium retained in theory their complete independence and self-determination, at the first onslaught they would be crumpled up before the German armies, and the attack upon England would be made, not only from the mouth of the Weser and the Elbe, but also from the Rhine and the Schelde.

An inconclusive peace would in fact imply two things, the increased power of Germany and the certainty of further war between Germany and Great Britain. But in addition to this it would mean that after the war Germany would be even more convinced than she was before, of the essential value of that which we call militarism; it would to them have been proven that it was by the army and the army alone that she had been saved, and therefore that it was on the army alone she must continue to depend for her existence and security in the future. In the days of peace which followed, she would continue as before to subordinate all her institutions to the

perfecting of her military power. If, as is indeed the case, the ultimate object of the war is the destruction of militarism, this can only be attained by eradicating the spirit of militarism from the heart of the German people, and there is no other way in which this can be done than by the defeat of the German army.

But let us suppose on the other hand that the war is carried on to its inevitable termination, that the resistance of the German armies is broken down and the spirit of the German people is broken by the effect of the blockade. A conclusion of this kind would make clear to the German nation in the only way in which it could be made, that immeasurable ambition inevitably brings with it Nemesis. They would learn, what every other country in Europe has learned, that it is impossible to defy with impunity the united voice of Europe.

Men talk much of the terms of peace; it is not the terms of peace which are important; what is important is victory. Let those who doubt this study the settlement of 1815. Then, not only was France defeated, but the armies of the victors twice in twelve months occupied Paris. The French learned, and they have never forgotten, the lesson of the retribution which comes to a nation which would allow itself to be dazzled by the deeds of a Napoleon. But we must notice this also, that it was the very completeness of the victory and the complete anni-

hilation for the time of French military power which enabled the Allies, in the terms of peace, to leave France as powerful and as united as she had been twenty-five years before at the beginning of the great war.

It might be said by any German into whose hands this book came, that if you contend that a complete victory is necessary for the security of the Allies, Germany also may justly maintain that this is true for her also, and that she has to protect herself against the "schemes of annihilation" with which she is threatened. In doing so, he would but be following the lead of the Chancellor and the other authorities quoted in this book, who again and again maintain that all that they demand is that which is necessary for the defence of their country against the threatened annihilation.

To this we might well answer that it is not England which annihilates states or peoples; if we wish for illustrations of annihilation we must go to those parts of Europe in which not England, but the German States are supreme, to Poland and Bohemia, to Serbia and Belgium. Since modern Europe began there is no single state in Europe of which it can be said that it has been deprived of its natural territories, or that its internal government has been permanently warped by British supremacy.

But apart from this, the answer of any English-

man is simple when he hears the statement that we are threatening Germany with annihilation. There is one person, and one only in this country, who is qualified to express authoritatively the objects with which England has entered the war, and those which she puts before herself for attainment in the case that victory attends her arms. Mr. Asquith has done this in words which it is scarcely necessary to repeat: "We shall never sheath the sword which we have not lightly drawn until Belgium recovers in full measure all and more than all that she has sacrificed, until France is adequately secured against the menace of aggression, until the rights of the smaller nationalities of Europe are placed upon an unassailable foundation, and until the military domination of Prussia is wholly and finally destroyed." And when the last sentence, as he himself points out, was first misquoted by the Chancellor and then its obvious meaning and intention distorted, he explains again the object in language which cannot be misinterpreted: "Great Britain, and France also, entered the war not to strangle Germany, not to wipe her off the map of Europe, not to destroy or mutilate her national life, certainly not to interfere with (to use the Chancellor's language) 'the free exercise of her peaceful endeavours.' . . . On several occasions in the last ten years Germany had given evidence of her intention to dictate to Europe under threat of war, and in violating the neutrality of Belgium

she proved that she meant to establish her ascendency, even at the price of a universal war and of tearing up the basis of European policy as established by treaty. The purpose of the Allies in the war is to defeat that attempt, and thereby pave the way for an international system, which will secure the principle of equal rights for all civilised states.

"As a result of the war we intend to establish the principle that international problems must be handled by free peoples, and that this settlement shall no longer be hampered and swayed by the overmastering dictation of a Government controlled by a military caste. That is what I mean by the destruction of the military domination of Prussia: nothing more, but nothing less."

The whole of this book is in fact a comment on and an expansion of these words, to which indeed it might appear that nothing had to be added.

It would be impertinent at the present time to enter on any discussion as to the details of the peace terms which would be demanded supposing the Allies were victorious in the war. And there is something profoundly undignified in declaring what we propose to do before we know whether we shall have the power to carry it out. It is however to be regretted that some French and English writers have given their support to plans which, if there were any chance of their being adopted by the Allied Governments, might justly

be interpreted as bringing about the annihilation of Germany, the partition of the country, the overthrow of the Empire. For this reason it may be well, even during the stress of war, to suggest that whatever the result may be, it is essential to keep clearly in sight the cardinal principles of European policy.

These are two. The first is that Europe is and should remain divided between independent national states. The second that, subject to the condition that they do not threaten or interfere with the security of other states, each country should have full and complete control over its own internal affairs.

From the first springs what I call the Magna Charta of Europe, the doctrine that the soil of Europe is not subject to conquest and annexation.

There can be no permanent settlement of European discord until this is generally accepted, The truth of it has been taught during the last hundred years of diplomacy. Since the time of the Reformation, nearly every war has been fought for the acquisition of territory. Wars will always continue so long as there is a prospect that success will enable the victor to extend the bounds of his own country. Permanent concord can only come when it is recognised that every State has the right to be protected against disruption by the co-operation of all the others. If at the end of this war the victory is used as victory has so often been used in the past, then there

evidently will be laid the foundations for a further struggle in the future.

To this maxim, however, the Allies must be faithful in victory, as they would claim that it should be observed were they defeated. Just as we repudiate the claim of Germany to annex any part of the soil of France or Belgium on the right of conquest, so we cannot claim to annex or conquer any part of the soil of Germany. However complete is the defeat of the German army, however far the allied troops penetrate on to German soil, the warnings of centuries must guard us against the irreparable error of attempting to separate from Germany any districts which are clearly and without dispute German.

This maxim is easy to state in general, but the application is not so simple. It has to be determined what are the natural frontiers of each nation. When that has been done they must be assigned and guaranteed by the general agreement of Europe.

What then are the natural limits of Germany? What is German soil? Of France we may say with certainty that there is not perhaps a single village which would claim to be transferred to another state. The annexations of 1861 in Nice and in Savoy have been ratified in the only way in which annexation can be ratified, by the willing acquiescence of the inhabitants. We know what are the natural limits of Spain and, as a result of the war, those of Italy will also

have to be determined. But what about Germany?

So much we may say, that nine-tenths of what is now included in the Empire is and will always remain German. Berlin and Cologne, Hamburg and Carlsbad, Breslau and Aachen and Mainz, as to these there is no doubt. But there are border districts, Alsace and Lorraine, the North of Schleswig, parts of the province of Posen, of which this cannot be said. Of these at least we may say that there is a question involved in them which may properly be brought before the Tribunal of Europe. Of these, but of no others.

It is useful to recall the title by which Germany holds these doubtful districts. The North of Schleswig is held by direct and cynical violation of the Treaty of Prague, to which Prussia had been herself a partner. It had been determined by this that Schleswig should be divided, and that the inhabitants of the Northern and border districts should be allowed themselves to determine by their votes whether they should become Prussian or Danish. This clause was inserted in the treaty between Prussia and Austria by the desire of the Emperor Napoleon III, who of course was the chief champion in Europe of the rights of the population to determine their own destiny. It was never carried out. The fall of the Empire, combined with the events of 1870 and 1871, deprived France both of the will and of the power to require its enforcement, and in 1878, when

the new alliance was formed between Germany and Austria, it was agreed that this clause should be allowed to lapse. It is clearly open to Europe to require that it should be revived, and against this no valid objection can be raised on the ground that to do so would be an injustice to Germany.

Alsace and Lorraine are of course held in virtue of the Treaty of Frankfort. It is a treaty imposed on France by the power of the sword, and one in which Europe as a whole was not consulted. The Germans could claim on their side historical right; they deliberately refrained from appealing for their sanction to the will of the population. With regard to one portion, Metz and districts in Lorraine, they were seized with a cynical disregard of everything but the right of the stronger and strategical reasons. The Treaty of Frankfort was imposed by the sword, and it can be dissolved by the same instrument by which it was created. But it is essential that the ultimate condition, whatever it may be, should be one determined not merely between France and Germany, but agreed to and ratified by Europe as a whole.

The question of the Polish provinces of Prussia is from the point of view of international relations more complicated. The present division of the country derives from the Treaty of Vienna, and received the formal and definite sanction of the assembled Powers of Europe. It is in fact the only part of those provisions of the Treaty of

Vienna, which dealt with the countries which had been conquered by Napoleon, that has not yet been revised. The settlement for Germany and for Italy, for the Netherlands and for Norway and Sweden, has in the course of the last hundred years been overthrown. Norway, Belgium, Germany, Italy, have in the process of time each attained the position of a self-governing and independent state. Poland alone remains; and on every ground of international convenience, of public policy and political equity, the time has come when that which has been done for Italy and for Germany herself should also be done for the Poles. The difficulties of the task will be enormous; but at this moment there is only one point on which it is necessary to insist, and that is that it is as absurd to speak of the restoration of Poland, even if this includes the separation of certain Polish-speaking districts from the German Empire, as the annihilation of Germany, as it would have been absurd to speak of the creation of a Kingdom of the Belgians as the annihilation of the Kingdom of the Netherlands or the emancipation of Lombardy and Venetia as the annihilation of the Austrian Empire.

The proposition that the nationality of these frontier and doubtful districts should at the end of this war come up for reconsideration is entirely consistent with the principle that the policy of Europe should be based on the mutual recognition among national states. Looking at the

matter without prejudice and without passion, we may recognise that the justification for this is to be found, not so much in the historical ground on which they were acquired, but on the facts of the present moment. There have been many annexations in the last hundred years which will not and cannot be revoked. Lombardy was won for Italy by the power of the sword, and Holstein was separated from Denmark; if no one suggests that this verdict should be reversed, the reason is that it was one entirely in accordance with the wishes of the population. Ultimately the fault of Germany is not so much that she wrested Alsace from France in war, as that she has shown herself unable to win the allegiance of the inhabitants in peace. Over forty years have elapsed since the Treaty of Frankfort; had the result been that the Alsatians had shown themselves willing and enthusiastic adherents of the German Empire, as the inhabitants of the other border districts, Metz and Lorraine, showed themselves loyal adherents of France after Louis XIV had forcibly annexed them to his crown, then there would have been no claim for Europe to interfere. It is notorious that this has not been the case. The inhabitants of the Province of Posen have been subject to the Kingdom of Prussia for a hundred years; there has been full opportunity to win over their affection and their loyalty; the opportunity has been lost.

And if Germany, even the German Socialists,

with indignation declaims against any suggestion for severing from the Fatherland any portion of these border districts, and if they cry out about the annihilation of Germany, we are at least justified in recalling the profound disregard and contempt with which the protests of France and the remonstrances of Europe were met in 1864 and 1871. The cry against the annihilation of the Fatherland and the division of the country, so far as it applies to these districts, comes with an ill grace from a nation which has shown such indifference to appeals for mercy from others.

As it is with the determination of German frontiers, so also with the internal arrangements and constitution of Germany. Suggestions are from time to time being made that the Allies ought to put before themselves the object of undoing the work which was achieved in 1866 and in 1871, by restoring those states which were annexed by Prussia and by revising the treaties under which Bavaria and the Southern States gave their adherence to the North German Federation. These suggestions seem outside the scope of practical policy. It is indeed true that no action of the Prussian Government was so counter to every principle of international morality as the treatment of Hanover. This event, on which English writers have been strangely silent, forms a much securer basis for criticism of Prussian methods than did the treatment of Schleswig-Holstein.

But it is impossible to reverse the verdict of history, for the annexation has been condoned by the only people who have a right to be heard, and that is by the Hanoverians themselves. The relations of Bavaria to Prussia have become a matter of internal German policy just as much as are those of Wales or Scotland to England. On this Europe has no claim to speak unless, indeed, there came at any time a cry for help from the Bavarians themselves.

M. Yves Guyot has suggested in his book *The Causes and Consequences of the War*, and also in an article published in *The Nineteenth Century and After*, that when the time comes to discuss terms of peace "The seventeen members of the Bundesrat who represent Prussia could not be admitted (to the Peace Conference) for the fate of Prussia cannot be determined by herself; it must be settled by the conquerors." This frankly seems to me as absurd, as it would be, were Germany to have won a complete victory in the war, that she should claim that the British Empire should be represented in the Peace Conference by Wales, Scotland, Ireland and the Dominions, but that no representatives from England should be admitted. On what grounds are the inhabitants of Cologne and Dusseldorf, of Hesse-Kassel, Hanover and Schleswig-Holstein (to omit the old Prussian provinces) to be debarred from the opportunity of taking their part in the consultations on which the future welfare of Germany must depend?

When M. Yves Guyot supports this and similar suggestions on criticisms made by Prince Bülow and others that the ancient spirit of particularism was not dead in Germany, he omits to take into consideration the result of a three years war. Whatever may have been the case before (and as to this there can I think be no doubt that Prince Bülow and other German critics, to a great extent deliberately and for political purposes, over-estimated the forces of disunion in Germany) there can be no doubt that now, by the mere fact of the common share which they have all taken in this great conflict, the German nation has been welded into a complete and indissoluble unity in the same way in which Prussia was so welded in the Seven Years War.

We have then two great principles, and they are principles to which the Allies have already given their adhesion. To them they must remain true.

It may be objected, and it doubtless will be, that in this criticism of the suggestions of many eminent and patriotic writers, I am allowing myself to be influenced by the desire that there should be no humiliation for Germany. As to this I can only say that the "humiliation of Germany" is not an object to be attained for its own sake, but only so far as it will lead to a better organisation of Europe in the future. Apart from and beyond this, the "humiliation of Germany" is certainly not worth the life of a single British soldier. It has often been pointed

out that in these great matters of international relations, it is unwise to allow ourselves to be guided by sentiment rather than by reason and calculation. But there is a sentiment of hatred as well as of respect and affection, and the indulgence of the passion of hatred, however justified it may be, is, as a practical guide, just as dangerous as that of sympathy. The "humiliation of Germany" would be necessarily and implicitly involved in the defeat of the German armies and the disappointment in the ambitions with which the war began; it would also arise from the consciousness of the loss of respect which had arisen from the manner in which the war has been conducted. Beyond this it does not appear to be a definite object of such a nature that a statesman would put it before himself for its own sake.

I have throughout this book deliberately refrained from referring to those questions involved in the methods by which the Germans have conducted the war. I have done so not from any indifference, for how could anyone be indifferent to acts which threaten to undermine the whole basis of modern European civilisation? but it seems to me desirable to separate the consideration of this matter entirely from the purely political questions which are at stake, even though these other considerations are (as I think is still the case) more important. For the same reason I have not considered the claims which the Germans make that their culture and civilisa-

tion is superior to that of other nations. I care not whether this claim is just or is foolish. Whatever view we might take on this matter, it cannot be contended that the superiority of modern German society is more superior to that of France and of England than was the civilisation of the France of Louis XIV to the Germany which emerged from the Thirty Years War, or the political condition of England to that of the Continent during the eighteenth century. But in modern Europe no temporary superiority possessed for a few decades by a single state can be made the justification for permanent political ascendency. No passage in Prince Bülow's recent work is wiser or more remarkable than that in which he warns the Germans against too insistent encomiums of their own culture, and reminds them that the world fears a hegemony of culture even more than political supremacy.

When will peace come? It will come when Germany is ready for it, and the time is approaching. It will come when Germany has learnt the lesson of the war, when it has learnt, as every other nation has had to learn, that the voice of Europe cannot be defied with impunity. It will come when Germany is ready to repudiate the persons and the principles that made the war inevitable, when the militarists and the chauvinists have become a despised and repudiated remnant, when the nation says "To you we listened, and

you we have obeyed, to you we have sacrificed all that holds us to life, the lives of our sons and our husbands and our fathers, the ideals and beliefs of our ancestors, and our own better nature. You have offered us wealth and power and the kingdoms of this world, and we accepted your offer and your promise, and what have we? For them we have bartered our all, and there is nothing in return but hunger and cold and nakedness, disease and death, ruin and destitution. Never in the history of the world has there been such unanimity in sacrifice; before our deeds the armies of Napoleon may bow the head, and what have we won by it? Two years ago the world was at our feet, to our cities men came from every land, and in every land our merchants were the most prosperous, our products were the most used, and it was our thoughts that men thought. And now travel round the globe, and we are the despised and hated of mankind, we have the curse of Cain on our brow, men shun us in the streets, and our language is ostracised. To you we owe it that the achievements of a century of national effort have been lost."

Germany asks for security, she shall have it—precisely the same security that France and Russia and Italy and Holland enjoy; a security based partly on her own strength, but even more on the recognition of the laws and principles of Europe. Germany asks for guarantees, she shall have them—precisely the same guarantees with

which every other State has to be content; the guarantee that the tyrannical overgrowth of any one State or confederation of States will inevitably arouse in the rest of Europe a coalition before which every nation, even the strongest, must bow. These laws of European life have been learnt in the course of centuries by all nations and accepted, and they have always been learnt in the same way, in the bitter school of experience and war. Germany is now learning the lesson, and the war will continue till the lesson has been completed; then it will stop. It will stop when it has been burnt into the heart of the whole nation so that it will never be forgotten. Men talk of the terms of peace. They matter little. With a Germany victorious no terms could secure the future of Europe, with a Germany defeated no artificial securities will be wanted, for there will be a stronger security in the consciousness of defeat.

CHAPTER I

TWO MANIFESTOES[1]

ONCE more the German Chancellor has made a speech in which he has for the fourth time repeated in almost identical words his definition of the reasons which brought Germany into the war. Again we have had a debate in the Reichstag,[2] in which the Chancellor and the party leaders have repeated their catechism and have told us their story of a peaceful Germany occupied only in the work of quiet development at home, forced unwillingly into war and waging it with the single desire to obtain security against another attack, and once more we see them attempting to make England responsible for not only the beginning but the continuation of the war.

It will, therefore, be worth while to examine what evidence we have as to the real aims which the "peaceful" German nation have in fact put before themselves. This will put in a truer light the rhetoric of the Chancellor. I propose, there-

[1] *The Nineteenth Century and After*, May 1916.

[2] April 5, 1916.

fore, shortly to examine the most authentic expressions of German national feeling and to compare them with his speeches. In doing so, I shall confine myself to those who can speak with some authority, as, for instance, the official spokesmen of the parties, and shall neglect the overwhelming mass of material provided in newspapers and magazines, so far as it can be represented to be merely the expression of private and individual opinion.

First let us take two important documents issued in the spring and summer of last year. The one is a petition to the Chancellor, originally drawn up in the month of March 1915, and again presented to him in May by six Economic Associations. These societies together represent all classes in the empire with the exception of the working classes (whose interests are represented by the Social Democrats, the Christian Socialists, and the Trade Unions). They correspond to the union of all the *bürgerliche*, or non-socialistic parties in the Reichstag, of which we shall have to speak below. The associations themselves have very large numbers of members, and they have affiliated branches in all parts of the country. They are not confined to Prussia, they include the manufacturers of Saxony and the peasant proprietors of Württemberg. They have all been founded at different times since the adoption of protection converted German politics into a struggle for supremacy between rival industrial

and financial claims. One of their chief duties, as it is indeed the prime reason for their existence, is the defence of the economic interests of their members in connection with the discussion of tariff and taxation; they have therefore a very active and real importance, they represent not so much opinions as interests, and for this reason their decisions carry weight with the Reichstag and the Government; a joint resolution by them cannot be dismissed as negligible, rather it is the weightiest form in which the wishes of the active and driving elements in the nation could be expressed. Generally they are rivals and opponents; this is probably the first time that they have all been found in agreement, but just for this reason their unanimity gives to their manifesto a weight which can rarely belong to any similar expression of opinion.[1]

The second document (which purports to emanate from "leaders of German thought") is a manifesto drawn up in June 1915 for the purpose of being presented to the Chancellor; it was published in Berne in August. It is said to have received 13,000 signatures, but a list of the names is not attainable, nor is it clear when, if ever, it was in fact presented to the Chancellor. On all main points, though the wording is different, it is in substance identical with the petition of the Economic Associations, and the two clearly have a common intellectual origin, unless indeed (as

[1] The two Manifestoes are printed at length in the Appendix

is perhaps more probable) the ideas and demands that they incorporate are so generally diffused among the more energetic and pushing circles that the similarity of language merely indicates how faithfully these documents reproduce the prevailing opinion.

What we may call the preamble is common form, common to all discussions of peace in all nations. Both begin by protesting against the idea of an immature peace or an indecisive peace.

"The present war must be followed by an honourable peace, corresponding to the sacrifices made and containing in itself the guarantee of its endurance.

"It must never be forgotten that our enemies declare unceasingly that Germany must be annihilated and struck out from the list of great Powers. In view of such aspirations we find no protection in treaties which will be trampled underfoot at the opportune moment. Our only guarantee consists in an economic and military enfeeblement of our adversaries, such that, thanks to it, peace will be ensured for a period as long as can be taken into consideration."

So far the Economic Associations. We have similar language from the "leaders of German thought":

"We want to defend ourselves with all our might against the repetition of such an attack

from the other side, against a whole succession of wars and against the possibility of our enemies again becoming strong. Moreover, we are determined to establish ourselves so firmly, on such a broad expanse of securely won homeland, that our independent existence is guaranteed for generations to come. . . . Only one fear exists in all classes of our people, that mistaken ideas of atonement, or even nervous impatience, might lead to the conclusion of a premature peace which could never be lasting . . . it may be that, owing to the numerical superiority of our enemies, we cannot obtain everything we wish in order to secure our position as a nation, but the military results of this war obtained by such great sacrifices must be utilised to the very utmost possible extent."

We will pass over these preliminary remarks: this general conception of the situation—a Germany which is to defend itself against threats of annihilation, and does so by weakening its enemies to such an extent that it need fear no attack in future. We will turn for the moment to the particular manner in which these desirable results are to be obtained; for what is remarkable in these documents is not the vague generalities with which they begin, but the precision with which they are worked out in detail. Though the wording is different the requests of the two are, in fact, identical.

First let us take the "Leaders of Thought."

"1. FRANCE

"After being threatened by France for centuries, and after hearing the cry of vengeance from 1815 till 1870, and from 1871 till 1915, we wish to have done with the French menace once for all. All classes of our people are imbued with this desire. There must, however, be no misplaced attempts at reconciliation (*Versöhnungsbemühungen*), which have always been opposed by France with the utmost fanaticism; and as regards this we would utter a most urgent warning to Germans not to deceive themselves. Even after the terrible lesson of this unsuccessful war of vengeance France will still thirst for revenge, in so far as her strength permits. For the sake of our own existence we must ruthlessly weaken her both politically and economically, and must improve our military and strategical position with regard to her. For this purpose, in our opinion, it is necessary radically to improve our whole western front from Belfort to the coast. Part of the North French Channel coast we must acquire, if possible, in order to be strategically safer as regards England and to secure better access to the ocean.

"Special measures must be taken to avoid the German Empire in any way suffering internally owing to this enlargement of its frontier and addition to its territory. In order not to have conditions such as those in Alsace-Lorraine, the most important business undertakings and estates must be transferred from anti-German ownership to German hands, France taking over and compensating the former owners. Such

portion of the population as is taken over by us must be allowed absolutely no influence in the Empire.

"Furthermore, it is necessary to impose a mercilessly high war indemnity (of which more hereafter) upon France, and probably on her rather than on any other of our enemies, however terrible the financial losses she may have already suffered owing to her own folly and British self-seeking. We must also not forget that she has comparatively large colonial possessions, and that, should circumstances arise, England could hold on to these with impunity if we do not help ourselves to them.

"2. BELGIUM

"On Belgium, on the acquisition of which so much of the best German blood has been shed, we must keep firm hold, from the political, military and economic standpoints, despite any arguments which may be urged to the contrary. On no point are the masses more united, for without the slightest possible doubt they consider it a matter of honour to hold on to Belgium.

"From the political and military standpoints it is obvious that, were this not done, Belgium would be neither more nor less than a basis from which England could attack and most dangerously menace Germany; in short, a shield behind which our foes would again assemble against us. Economically, Belgium means a prodigious increase of power to us.

"In time also she may entail a considerable addition to our nation, if in course of time the Flemish element, which is so closely allied to us,

becomes emancipated from the artificial grip of French culture and remembers its Teutonic affinities.

"As to the problems which we shall have to solve once we possess Belgium, we would lay special stress on the inhabitants being allowed no political influence in the Empire, and on the necessity for transferring from anti-German to German hands the leading business enterprises and properties in the districts to be ceded by France."

But this is only one sector of the war: there must be a similar extension of territory in the East. "Russia is so rich in territory that she will be able to pay an indemnity in kind by giving lands, but lands without landlords." But let it not be thought that Germany is going to conclude the war without similar surrender by Great Britain in the Colonial field. "We must supplant the world-trade of Great Britain." The alliance with Austria-Hungary and Turkey will open up the Balkans. "Thus we shall assure ourselves of the Persian Gulf against the pretensions of Russia and Great Britain." To this is to be added a new African Empire: "In Africa we must reconstitute our Colonial Empire." "Central Africa is only a huge desert, which does not offer enough colonial wealth. We therefore require other productive lands, and herein is to be found the importance of our alliance with Islam and the utility of our maritime outlet."

"We must have Egypt—that is where England must be shaken. The Suez Canal route will then be free, and Turkey will regain her ancient right."

The petition of the Economic Associations is equally definite; they demand the incorporation with Germany of the whole of Belgium, the adjacent districts of France, including the coast as far as the mouth of the Somme—that is, the whole coast of the Channel with Calais and Boulogne, and the frontier borders of the Vosges, including Belfort and Verdun. In the East they ask for the annexation of at least part of the Baltic Provinces with the districts to the south of them—that is, at least a large portion of the Kingdom of Poland. If the demands in this direction are comparatively moderate, this is to be attributed to the fact that at the time the petitions were drawn up the German occupation of Poland was still incomplete.

These are the demands, the demands as formulated a year ago. It will be well to keep them in mind when we read these self-complacent explanations of the Chancellor that Germany has in the war no object but security and self-defence, and that they have no lust for world dominion.

But those who wish to understand the motives and principles of these new statesmen should not omit to consider the exposition of the reasons for the annexations in Europe, and the choice of the territories to be taken. We feel that we have to do with modern men; they are not romanticists,

they do not trouble us with the historical arguments which were dear to the Germans of the old school, nor is there any suggestion that this reunion may be justified on the ground of nationality.

The grounds are double: military and economic. As to the first, the military and strategic point: "Belgium must be annexed, as otherwise it would be a *point d'appui* for England against us"; and as to France we have a sentence which alone sums up the whole of German military thought. "The lines of natural fortification of France, if they remained in the hands of the French, would constitute a permanent menace against our frontier." This is one of those pregnant statements the full signification of which grows upon one. The *natural* line of fortifications of France, is not that the defence of France? are not the fortifications situated on the *natural* soil of France, the barriers on the road into the country? Are they not the lock to the door, the drawbridge and portcullis by which invaders, robbers, freebooters are excluded? But they are a permanent menace to the German frontier; the security of other nations is a menace to Germany. What language is this? in what other country could it have been used? Let us be done with the childish talk of the "peaceful" German nation, let us recognise that here we have not from the mouth of the Government, not from Prussian militarism, but from the leaders in

business and commerce, from those occupied with the peaceful arts of husbandry and manufacture, the pure and unadulterated voice of the tyrant State. Germany is to be protected by a triple wall which guards her against every assault, but the land of her neighbours is to lie open and unprotected to every assault of the robber bands.

Germany is to have full security, a security to be attained by a strategic frontier. But what about France? Has not Metz for forty years been held by Germany in conscious and deliberate violation of every principle of nationality for no other reason than that it should be used as a sally-port, giving Germany the control of the passage of the Vosges, a military position held on the very soil of France itself, a pistol directed against Paris? Germany is to have her strategic frontier, but is not Italy entitled also to ask for the same thing? In the final settlement of Europe is Austria to continue to hold the passage into Italy and from the summit of the Alps to dominate the plains of Lombardy and Venetia?

But these associations are not, of course, primarily responsible for military matters; on economic matters they speak with authority. Their work comes in the division of the spoil. The loot is not to be taken hastily and indiscriminately—they will choose what is valuable and leave the dross. They count up the spoil of France and Russia, as the mother of Sisera counted up the spoil from the slaughtered

Israelites. "Have they not sped? Have they not divided the prey; to every man a damsel or two; to Sisera a prey of divers colours of needlework, meet for the necks of them that take the spoil?"

But there was no prey for Sisera and the Amalekites; only the waters of the river Kishon and the lonely death in a desert tent. "So let all Thine enemies perish, O Lord," and then perhaps "the land will have rest forty years."

Nothing is to be taken from France except for strategic reasons which has no economic value.

What gives a nation wealth and power? Mineral resources—therefore the territory to be annexed from France must be chosen to include the mining district of Briey, and in addition the coal areas in the Departments of Le Nord and the Pas de Calais.

"This with the coastline will enable full use to be made of the canals and enable the ports at the mouth of the canals to assume their full importance. The security of the German Empire in a future war imperiously calls for all the beds of minerals, including the fortresses of Longwy and of Verdun, without which these mineral beds cannot be protected. The possession of great quantities of coal, and especially of coal rich in bitumen, which abounds in the basin of the North of France, is, at least in as great measure as iron ore, decisive for the issue of the war. Belgium and the North of France together produce more than forty millions of tons."

Here we have the very essence of *Realpolitik*. It is naked and undisguised. You are rich and I am strong, you have coal and iron and wealth which I should like to have. My armies are stronger than yours, and if I take this they will become even stronger and yours will become weaker. Therefore I will take them.

In this way the industrial resources of the Empire will be increased. But experience has shown that the prosperity of a nation and its success in war requires a certain equilibrium between industry and agriculture. "The present economic structure of Germany has proved so favourable in the present war that the necessity for maintaining it . . . may well be considered as the general conviction of the people." And as we all know, the political equilibrium of Germany depends on a working compromise between the great industrialists and what we call the landed interest. In England we have neglected this, industrial interests look on the landed classes rather as a hostile interest to be kept down; the Germans are wiser. And so, as the two industrial societies have chosen their share in the plunder, the agriculturists must be treated with no less generosity. Rivals at home, the two interests coalesce in plundering other nations. The very fact that the best mining districts are taken from France is a reason why extensive agricultural districts should be taken from Russia.

And again Germany wants men.

"If Germany failed to annex agricultural territories on our Eastern frontier, we should be restricting the possibility of increasing by a sufficient growth of the population of Germany her military power as against Russia. . . . National popular vigour depends on a vigorous agriculture, and it is necessary to ensure the growth of our population and to strengthen by that very means our military power."

A mere Englishman or Frenchman might here make objection that if districts already occupied by alien and probably hostile races are annexed they will not really increase German power, but prove a source of weakness. But German science neglects nothing, and he will find this objection anticipated. It is an obvious danger to be removed. This is easy enough: easy, at least, to those who have freed their minds from "sentiment." The present owners will be expropriated and German settlers placed on the land in their place. "We must make possible a German agrarian colonisation on a large scale, and the repatriation upon German territory of German peasants living abroad, and especially in Russia."

"These territorial increases assume that the population of the annexed territories will not be able to obtain a political influence upon the destinies of the German Empire, and that all the sources of economic power in these territories, including properties great and small, will pass into German hands."

This is at least simple; the French and Russians will be turned out, and their place will be taken by Germans. The mistake made in dealing with Alsace-Lorraine will not be repeated. Lille and Warsaw will not only be annexed by Germany, they will become German. Could anything be more satisfactory?

There will be no difficulty in doing this; the cost of the expropriation will be borne by France and by Russia. It will be part of the war indemnity.

Do not let it be thought that it is the Associations alone who advocate these measures. They receive the full approval of the "leaders of thought." "In order not to have conditions such as those in Alsace-Lorraine the most important business undertakings and estates must be transferred from anti-German ownership to German hands, France taking over and compensating the former owners." As in France, so also in Russia.

It will be convenient to consider for a moment this last demand, which is common to the two documents. Here we have deliberately put forward by large numbers of highly influential Germans the request, not only for annexation of the conquered territory, but annexation in such a form that the inhabitants of the conquered provinces are to be deprived of all political rights and disappropriated of their possessions, which are to be transferred to German hands. In a word, parts of Europe are to be treated as we should never treat conquered territories of Africa; once

more the condition of subjects deprived of the rights of citizenship, a condition which we thought had been finally abolished from Western Europe, is to be re-established. Those who have been citizens of the two freest countries in Europe are to become Helots and outlanders. In their own homes these French, these Belgian, these Polish subjects are to become as Rayahs or Fellaheen of the Turkish Empire. They are to be hewers of wood and drawers of water for their German lords. Two years ago it would, I think, have been considered impossible that a suggestion of this kind for the treatment of any district in Western Europe should have been made by any civilised individual, but in truth the doctrine of German *Kultur* drags us into strange places.

Many and strange indeed are the ideas that spring up like weeds in the brains of Germany. Turning over the pages of the *Turmer*, I find an unknown writer who tells us that "Germans abroad must be collected together." "As many as possible of them must be rescued from their present position." This must be done by far-reaching transplantation.

"In a time of the mass movement of the armies, we must not shrink from mass movements of the population. William the Second must carry out on a great scale a policy of transplanting adopted by the Assyrian and Babylonian Kings. Why not, for instance, drive out the Walloons of

Belgium to France, Algeria, Morocco, Brazil, and occupy the country with Germans? "

At the beginning of the war I ventured to compare the spirit of modern Germany with that of the Assyrian kings—it seemed a bold comparison, but I now find that it was even truer than I thought.[1] My experience is that no suggestion can be made so contrary to right reason and to European tradition, but it will soon be outdone by some German writer.

It may be said that we need not trouble about these wild thoughts, they will have no effect in practice. We cannot content ourselves with this. After all the fundamental conception of the Germans as a superior race, annexing and if necessary disposing of the lands of inferior peoples, is in complete accord with the history of the policy of Prussia. It is not merely the chimera of a few exaggerated theorists. It has behind it practical experience, and is merely the reproduction, on a larger scale and under what would be more favourable conditions, of what the Prussian Government have already begun. The proposed annexations in France and Belgium are merely a repetition on a larger scale of what has already been done in Schleswig and in Alsace-Lorraine. And the method of expropriation is the principle on which the Polish districts of Prussia have in fact been governed for the last

[1] *England, Germany and Europe.* Macmillan, 1914.

twenty years—that the Poles should become Germans, that the German language should be substituted for Polish, and that the Polish landed proprietors should be expropriated and make room for Germans. The only difference is that, while hitherto it has been necessary to do this at the expense of the Prussian Government, the fact that there has been a war would enable the same ends to be carried out at the expense of others, and with far better prospects of success.[1]

We may even go further and recognise that under modern conditions action of this kind is the necessary result of annexation. We must not look on these suggestions as the wild vagaries of theorists. They are based on the recognition of a practical truth. The modern state, depending as it does on universal suffrage and universal military service, requires a certain amount of homogeneity of feeling among the inhabitants. Its close texture will not admit the presence of large districts the people of which revolt from the fundamental principle on which the State is established. You cannot have in a national State such as France or Germany provinces which deny assent to the nationality, refuse so far as they can to accept the obligations which the State requires from all its members, and use their political power not to strengthen but to destroy it. This the Germans have learnt from the pre-

[1] The reader will find a considered defence of this policy in Bülow's *Imperial Germany*.

sence in the Reichstag of the *Reichsfeindliche* parties, the Poles, the Danes, the Alsatians. In an assembly summoned to assist in the government of the Empire there is no place for those whose only wish is either to destroy it or at least to separate from it. Especially dangerous is the presence of this element in the State when the revolting provinces are situated on the very frontiers of the country immediately contiguous to its permanent enemies. Even now the presence of these alien enemies has been an embarrassment; were the numbers increased it would be a serious danger.

If then there is to be annexation, it must be followed by some such measure. These writers, starting from the assumption that everything that is for the strength of Germany must be adopted, do not shrink from the conclusion that annexation must be accompanied by that which they rightly see is its logical conclusion. To this end all must be sacrificed; justice, honour, humanity are dismissed as mere sentiment. But we are thankful to them for pointing out to us the dilemma, and we shall adopt the conclusion that as this is the logical result of any annexation, then the policy of annexation is *ipso facto* condemned not only for Germany but for every other civilised state, and boldly accept what is the Magna Carta of our times—that the soil of Western Europe is not and cannot be the subject of annexation and conquest.

And what, if the suggestions of the petition were carried out, would be the fate of the Frenchmen who still are to belong to France? Belgians there will be no more.

Before this new Germany, with its 80,000,000 inhabitants, this Germany which rules from the mouth of the Somme to the Gap of Belfort, this Germany, whose frontier is brought within fifty miles of Paris, what will be the position of France, a France deprived of the great manufacturing districts of the North? It will have but a precarious independence, enjoyed by the favour of Germany, an independence such as that which Austria would have deigned to allow to Serbia, or Napoleon to Prussia.

It will doubtless be said: Why trouble about these manifestoes? After all, they do not represent the opinion of the whole of Germany, and, even if they did when they were drafted represent what many thought, much has happened since then; opinion is changing, the voice of reason and moderation has been making itself heard. This is true; men like Professor Delbrueck and Harden, not to speak of the writers in papers such as *Die Hilfe*, expressly or by implication, do what they can to stem the effect of the more extreme writers, and a careful reading of some of the more important daily papers, such as the *Berliner Tageblatt* and the *Frankfurter Zeitung*, shows a growing desire for reconciliation and peace, if not with England, at least with France.

But this is just the reason why it is necessary to keep these earlier expressions in mind. There has been a change, the change is constantly working, the time will come when it is completed. But the cause of the change has been the war, and it is this change which is the best justification for the continuance of the war, for the work is not yet finished. Had Germany secured, as she expected, a speedy and complete victory, it is by the men whose words I have quoted that the policy of the country would have been decided; their demands would, if not completely at least to a large extent, have been carried out. The war will not have done its work till the very conception of such schemes has been finally and irrevocably eliminated from the German mind. When this has been done, then Germany will once more be ready to take her place as an equal member of the European federation.[1]

Both the petition and the manifesto were suppressed by the German Government, no discussion of them was permitted, and we do not know to what extent they would have commanded the support of the nation. The very fact of the petition being made was indeed most inconvenient to the Government. What they show is the spirit and the conception that were moving in the heart of the German nation; they show what Europe would have had to face had Germany come trium-

[1] As is pointed out below, these proposals have received the express approval of Premier Bülow: see p. iii.

phant out of the war. They were suppressed, for the result was doubtful; we can be sure that were victory secured these ideals would have been pressed on the Government with great force, and would have found expression in the Reichstag and in public agitation. Against a condition such as this, so far as it prevails, there is one remedy only, war and defeat. With victory it would thrive, and had Germany been victor it would have spread throughout the nation; with every week that the war continues this spirit will weaken and decay, and by defeat it would be destroyed.

But it must not be thought that these documents are in contradiction to the general tendency of German thought. If we leave out the Assyrian element the essence of the whole is that the result of the war must be an alteration in the political condition and in the map of Europe, the object of which will be to give to Germany that complete security which can only be attained by undisputed ascendency. The essential thing is that there are to be large annexations which will completely guarantee the territory of Germany from attack, and thereby leave all other countries open and defenceless to attack from Germany. An enlarged empire, an empire so strong that no one alone or in coalition will be able to attack it—that is the avowed aim of every responsible political leader or party.

CHAPTER II

THE PARTY LEADERS[1]

It is well known that any discussion of the end of the war is forbidden; none the less all the German political parties have found an opportunity, both by their spokesmen in the Reichstag and by formal resolutions of their committees, to give their opinion on these matters. With the one exception of the Socialists there is in these opinions an absolute identity, and in all essentials they are at one with the two manifestoes that we have been considering. What they require is terms of peace which shall give to Germany the opportunity for free development of her power, and as a means to this they demand such extension of territory as may be necessary for this purpose. They differ from the manifestoes only in this, that they do not attempt to determine precisely how great the extension shall be.

It will be interesting to quote some of these dicta. And first let us put that of the second man in the Empire, the King of Bavaria:

[1] *Nineteenth Century and After*, May 1916.

" The heavy sacrifices which the whole German people has made, require that we shall not conclude peace until the enemy has been overthrown, and we get a peace which, for as long as we can foresee, ensures the free continuance of every kind of development of the whole people, *till we have frontiers which will take away from our opponents the desire of falling on us again* and calling upon enemy after enemy against us." [1]

The German parties fall into three groups: first, the Conservatives and National Liberals, which together form the coalition on which the Government depends. Side by side with them are the two great independent parties, the Centre and the Socialists. The opinion, as to peace, of the Government parties is unanimous. First we have the Conservatives. The committee have published their opinion; after speaking of the necessity for overthrowing definitely the gigantic power of the Russians and securing national safety in the East; after pointing out that the overthrow of England must always be kept in the first rank as the most important object of the war, it continues:

" With the whole Conservative party and with the whole German people, the committee is at one in the resolution not to shrink from any

[1] These quotations are taken from a useful collection entitled *Deutsche Kriegszielkundgebungen*, by Heinrich Michaelsen, Verlag Edwin Runge, Berlin Lichterfelde.

sacrifice which is necessary to carry on the war to a permanent and honourable peace which will secure the foundations for the future of Germany. *It will as a matter of course support all the annexations which are necessary for this purpose.*"

On December 5 and 6, 1915, there was a common meeting of the Conservative and the Free Conservative Parties; they came to the following resolution:

" . . . The German people is strongly and unanimously convinced that the great sacrifices in life and wealth which it offers and will continue to offer willingly and with enthusiasm must not be in vain. They demand, as the aim of peace, a Germany strengthened in its whole position, *enlarged beyond its present borders by retaining the greatest amount of those territories which are now occupied.* These frontiers must be secured from every attack on East and West, freedom on the sea must be unconditionally guaranteed, and a strengthening of our national power must be secured which corresponds to our great stakes."

The National Liberals hold an important part in German politics; they are connected by an unbroken historical lineage with the great party which before 1870 put themselves at the head of the national movement for a united Germany; they are the party which have above all others given dignity and credit to parliamentary dis-

cussions. Their leader, Herr Bassermann, has on several occasions explained the views of the party on peace. In July 1915 he tells us:

"As at the front our brave warriors persevere in the heat of the conflict and *will hear of no peace which does not bring us the frontiers in which we find security against future wars*, those who remain at home stand firmly and decisively for an energetic policy. . . . There can be no talk of a policy which thinks of a restoration of the condition before the war—the victor who in millions of his best sons stakes his life for the fatherland will bring back from the war *a greater and stronger Empire*, a security in the future against a new criminal war.

In an article in the *Deutsche Kurier* of August 4, 1915, he speaks of the heroic nation:

"Filled with the firm will for power for a greater and stronger Germany, we do not aim at Utopias in the Black Continent; it is not there that our future lies. So long as England can close the realm of proud Amphitrite all possessions in other continents are insecure. It is on the soil of Europe which has been manured by blood that there is growing up for us a German crop, and we will still the tears of those who have given their dear ones if we can say to them: Thy son, thy husband has fallen for this greater and stronger Germany—bloody sacrifices have been offered, and more will fall; they must provide the foundation for a *territorial expansion*

of our country, for boundaries in the East and West which will secure us peace for a generation."

In the Reichstag, in the debate of August 20, 1916, he spoke in similar language of the firm determination to secure frontiers in East and West which would forbid the repetition of so terrible a war.

The central committee of the party has expressly approved of his language, and in a meeting of August 15 defined the objects of the war as follows:

"The result of the present war can only be a peace which, by *enlarging our frontiers on the East and West and overseas*, gives us military, political, and industrial security against new attacks, and recompenses the immense sacrifices which the German people has made and is determined to continue until a victorious end."

The *Freisinnige*, or Progressive People's Party, are the small remnants of the once powerful party which upheld in Germany the cause of liberalism and free trade. On this matter they do not differ from those to whom they are generally opposed. Their committee drew up a resolution on December 4 and 5, 1915. In this they state:

"The committee is convinced that the conditions of peace must not offer to the German

Empire, as our opponents still continue to write, at best restoration of the conditions before the war, but rather permanent protection against foreign attacks and a *permanent increase of power, of wealth, and, so far as its security seems to require, also of territory.*"

The party of the Centre is more cautious. They do not definitely commit themselves to the requirement of territorial annexation. In their resolution of October 24, 1915, they say:

"The external conditions for a prosperous development of the German people are, as the experiences of the war fairly show, increased security against the military and industrial plans of our enemy for our annihilation. The terrible sacrifices which the country has laid upon our people call for a strengthened protection of our land in East and West, which will take from our enemies the wish to fall upon us again and which will permanently secure the industrial provision for our growing population. To this increased security of our Empire there must be added a similar security for our allied States."

If they have not in their own party meeting committed themselves to the policy of annexation, they joined in the common declaration made by all the parties, except the Social Democrats, in the great sitting of December 9, and it will be noticed that the spokesman of this joint mani-

festation was Dr. Spahn, the leader of the Centre. The declaration ends as follows:

"We await in full unity, with quiet resolution, and, let me add, in trust in God, the hour which makes possible peace negotiations, in which the military, industrial, and political interest of Germany must be completely and permanently secured, *including those extensions of territory* which are necessary for this purpose."

We have, then, the unanimous declaration of the parties in favour of annexations, the object of which is what they call the security, what we call the domination of Germany; for for them no security is sufficient which leaves any one strong enough to oppose their will. But these annexations must be the forcible conquest of men of alien race, against their will. Where in Europe is there a single village that desires to be annexed to Germany? The end of the war is, then, according to these men, to be a simple reversion to the old law of conquest, a return to the days when each State held its lands, as it had won them, by the sword, and the politics of Europe was an endless scheming and struggle for territory; for that which is won by the sword may be lost by the sword.

This solution is to make this war but one in an endless chain of wars, but it is the one which the responsible leaders are trying to force upon the Government.

What credit, then, are we to give to the Chancellor when in one of his latest speeches (April 5, 1916) he says:

"What is it that gives us strength to continue fighting? Who can seriously believe that it is lust for an extension of our frontiers that inspires our storming columns before Verdun, and makes them accomplish ever more heroic deeds? It is not for a piece of foreign territory that Germany's sons are bleeding and dying."

The united voices of the responsible and elected representatives of the people give him the lie. It is for an extension of territory that they are fighting; it is by the attainment of this that the tears of the mothers are to be stilled. If this is not won, the sacrifices will have been in vain.

"We will still the tears of those who have given their dear ones if we can say to them: Thy son, thy husband, has fallen for a greater and stronger Germany; bloody sacrifices have been offered, and more will fall; they must provide the foundation for a territorial extension of our country."

And let it not be thought that time has made any real change in their desires. The insistence on annexation remains to-day. In the last debate the Chancellor, as always, avoided the word "annexation." His references to Belgium were not explicit enough; all that he spoke of was

the protection of the Flemings. It might seem that he was hedging. His words did not satisfy the assembly, and he had to be corrected. Once more Dr. Spahn spoke as the mouthpiece of his party, and this time he insisted that, at any rate for Belgium, the proposals of the Chancellor were insufficient.

"Peace aims must be power aims. The war must end with a tangible result. Towards the East the Chancellor has held one out to us; towards the West he has spoken more guardedly. In respect to Belgium he has said that we must see to it that it shall no longer be an advanced post of England, but—as I conceive necessarily follows—pass militarily, politically, economically into our hands."

It is to be noted that the Chancellor had avoided saying this. Dr. Spahn gives to his words a force which they did not really have. It is not an explanation, but a correction; the German "dass Belgien in unsere Hände kommt" can have no meaning but annexation. This is shown by the continuation:

"This leaves the political internal organisation of the country untouched. This will be decided by peace when it is really made. We wished for no war of conquest—that I repeat with the Chancellor—but now we must rectify our frontiers in our own interests. Our enemies must not

remain untouched in their political and military nucleus."

What the Chancellor really meant is discussed in Chapter III. He had obviously carefully chosen his words so as to leave the way open for a settlement which would secure full German control without a formal annexation. This was not enough for the representatives of the German nation or the Centre Party. They would not be put off with anything short of an explicit declaration that Belgium was to become German.

It is interesting to quote the comment of the *Kölnische Volkszeitung*, one of the most important Catholic papers in Germany: "Unfortunately the war aim, which the Chancellor sketched for the West, is not so clearly defined (as that for the East). This the leader of the Centre, Spahn, clearly showed. It is true that the Chancellor promised that the occupied countries in the West, in which the blood of the people had flown, should not be given up without a complete security for the future. It is true that the Chancellor again announced real guarantees that Belgium should not become an English-French vassal-state, and should not be used as a military and industrial bulwark built out against Germany. The Flemish race, which has so long been kept down, must not again be given over to Frenchification. But the stormy applause and the clapping, with which his announcement of war aims in the

East was followed, could not accompany these words of the Chancellor, because they sounded indefinite. It is to be wished that the Chancellor had spoken with equal decision and firmness about the war aims in the West, as Spahn did amid the applause of the House."

It is the old story—they will be satisfied with nothing less than that Belgium should come into the absolute possession and control of Germany. The rest of the debate illustrated this. The Socialist speaker protested against Dr. Spahn's words, for he desired no violence to other nations. The other speakers supported Dr. Spahn; the National Liberal said that, as to Belgium, "not only must the *status quo ante* be excluded, but the military, political, and economic supremacy of Germany must be secured." The Conservative speaker definitely expressed his disagreement with the Socialists on this point: "treaties would not be sufficient; they must keep a firm hold on the country."

Now, as at the beginning of the war, the aims of the nation as expressed by the politicians are the extension of the German Empire by the annexation to it, or the permanent subjugation, of at least Belgium and parts of Poland.

And even if there is, as seems to be the case, a growing tendency to moderation in the statement of the claim, this is due solely to the events on the field of battle. As the difficulties of achievement become more obvious the note becomes

lower. Once again we see the effect of the war. But let there be any weakness in the conduct of the war, let the French relax their almost superhuman efforts, let the English give signs of disunion, let the Russians hold out hopes of some accommodation, and immediately the strident note would once more be heard; and we cannot doubt that it would have been heard had the attack on Verdun met with the success that was hoped from it.

CHAPTER III

THE GERMAN CHANCELLOR AND PEACE [1]

I

DURING the last few months the world has been the witness of a new phenomenon—the German Chancellor as the emissary and apostle of peace. If we are to believe his words there is nothing which he and the German Government, of which he is, if not the guide and leader, at least the figure-head and mouthpiece, have so much at heart as the peace of Europe and the freedom of the smaller nations. He would persuade the world that if the war continues it is not the fault of Germany but of England—that his own country, now as always the model of reason and justice, does not stand in the way of a speedy and permanent peace.

Those who have followed his previous attempts to show that it was not Germany but England that was responsible for the outbreak of the war will not expect that he will have much greater success in dealing with the conclusion of it. His task is indeed as difficult in the one case as

[1] *The Nineteenth Century and After*, July 1916.

in the other, for there can be little doubt that in both he is the advocate of a policy and actions of which he disapproves, and has to defend before the public that which he opposed in the Council-chamber; and one often feels that the very violence and noisiness of his protestations are evidence of the conscious weakness of his cause. His attempts to throw the guilt on England need not trouble us. England has broad shoulders, and the experience of many centuries of history, an experience which Germany has not enjoyed, has made the nation indifferent to the misrepresentations and calumnies which are the inevitable accompaniment of a prolonged and bitter war. The mind of the nation has long been made up. We know that the present is the time not for words but for deeds, and that it is by deeds, not by words, that peace alone can be achieved. England will go on her way and continue the work that she has undertaken, not from any love of it, but because no other course is possible.

But none the less it is worth while to inquire what amount of truth underlies the campaign of assurances and protestations that the Chancellor has undertaken, for, if not here, there are some in other countries who are inclined to be impressed, and the constant reiteration of statements, however remote from the truth, never fails to have some effect on opinion.

What are the claims that he makes? We will give them in his own words:

"Twice within the last few months Germany has announced before the world her readiness to make peace on a basis safeguarding her vital interests, thus indicating that it is not Germany's fault if peace is still withheld from the nations of Europe."

These words are taken from Herr von Jagow's despatch to the German ambassador in America. They are corroborated by an interview of the Chancellor with the Chicago journalists on May 23.

"Twice, publicly, I stated openly that Germany was ready to negotiate on a basis which would protect her against future attacks by a coalition and secure the peace of Europe."

The two occasions referred to are, of course, the Chancellor's speeches in the Reichstag in December and April last. We had all read these speeches and considered their bearing on the question of peace. It was not easy to know how much importance we should attach to them. We were not disposed to criticise them very minutely; we remembered the difficulties with which he was confronted. He was addressing an assembly of his own people, and on these occasions it seemed probable that it was the immediate rather than the remoter audience which he had in mind. His own countrymen might well be to him of greater importance than the outer world. His

first duty must be to preserve unity at home. It was not an easy one.

He was confronted by two great masses of opinion supremely antipathetic to one another and each very suspicious of him and the Government. He could not risk offending either, and if possible he must aim at maintaining the temporary but uncertain truce which existed. On the one side was the *bloc* of the *bürgerliche* parties insistent that the war in which Germany had, as it seemed to them, won such great successes, should not be allowed to conclude without a striking addition to German strength and territory; on the other side the Socialists, who insisted that the war should not be continued a moment longer than was necessary, and whose formula was that no humiliation of other nations was permissible. If he offended the first his own position would be compromised. We can well believe that Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg, who has already sacrificed so much on the altar of patriotism, would willingly leave the office he holds were he to think that this would be for the benefit of his country; but he could not but know that, were he to fall, his place would in all probability be taken by one who would be a mere instrument in the hands of the Chauvinists, and he realises well how essential it is to keep up at least the appearance of moderation. Did he alienate the Socialists, then the unity of the nation would be destroyed and the Government would no longer

be assured of the moral support of the nation, which alone would enable it to contend against the hardships which he could see approaching. Were he to commit the Government to a policy of annexation, a great agitation would be started with the cry that the blood of the German soldiers was being shed, not for the protection of the Fatherland, but for aggression.

We were, therefore, more inclined to regard these speeches as evidence of the position of parties and opinions in Germany than as a serious contribution to the question of peace. We seemed justified in this view because the terms held out were of such a kind that he must himself have known that they could not for a moment have been considered by the States with which Germany is at war, as they were terms which completely conceded to Germany every matter of controversy. Now, however, the situation is changed. The German Government officially refers to them as proof that it is not Germany which is prolonging the war. They are used to throw the onus for this upon the Allies, and especially upon England. We must, therefore, examine them more carefully than we need otherwise have done.

II

The Chancellor alludes to two speeches, but we have in reality four, for on four occasions the Chancellor has spoken of the end of the war, and

the two later to which he specifically refers cannot be understood unless read in connexion with the two earlier.

The first was delivered on May 28, 1915. It is chiefly occupied with the change in the situation caused by the entrance of Italy into the war. At the end he considers the general position, and sums it up in the following words:

"Gentlemen, if the Governments of the countries hostile to us believe that they can put off the day of awakening by deceiving the people and can conceal the responsibility for the crime of this war, they are stirring up blind hatred. We, supported on our good confidence, on our just cause, and on our victorious sword, will not allow ourselves to be moved a hair's-breadth from the course which we have recognised as the right one. In the midst of this confusion of spirit and feelings, the German people goes its own way, quietly, and in confidence. It is not with hatred that we wage this war, but with anger, holy anger. The greater is the danger which, surrounded by enemies on every side, we have to endure, the more the love for our home stirs our heart, the more we care for our children and grandchildren, so much the more must we endure till we have gained and created every possible real guarantee and security, so that none of our enemies—not alone, not united—will again venture on a trial of strength with us. (Enthusiastic applause, shouts of 'Bravo,' and clapping of hands in the House and among the spectators.) The wilder is the storm that rages round us, the

firmer must we build up our own house for ourselves."

Here, then, we have the pose assumed by the German nation—injured innocence, a just cause, and a victorious sword. A glorious spectacle; a nation disturbed in the peaceful work of culture; but willingly she accepts the challenge and goes her way surrounded by enemies—a modern Galahad without hate, but in holy anger. Of course, we might point out that the holy anger of the German nation is lightly kindled, that they do not know the difference themselves between hate and anger. Else why this collection of one hundred poems of hate, of which Lissauer's is merely the best known; else why these enthusiastic appreciations of the young art and literature which is to be built up on the basis of hate; else why Professor Sombart and Professor Lasson, who tell us that the hatred of England is shared by the whole nation down to the cabdrivers of Berlin?

Not hate, but holy anger. The sentiment seems strangely familiar. "I feel no hatred," observed Mr. Pecksniff. "I am hurt, I am wounded, but I have no malevolence. If there is anger in my bosom it is, I hope, a sacred and, shall I say, a holy emotion; but I do not hate you, my good sir, I do not hate you."

That which concerns us, however, are the last words, for they show what is the end to be

achieved—"a real guarantee, a security," so that "no one of our enemies, alone or united, will ever again venture to take up arms against us."

It is a thought which constantly recurs; it is the key of his speeches, just as the freedom of the small nations and the destruction of Prussian militarism is that of Mr. Asquith's; it is his one contribution to the peace controversy.

III

In his next speech it is explained and expanded. This was delivered on August 18. He could then speak with greater decision and certainty; Germany had won great and perhaps unexpected successes. Warsaw had fallen, and nearly the whole of Congress Poland was occupied by German and Austrian troops. The English offensive at Neuve Chapelle had failed; there seemed every prospect that Germany would at the worst be able to hold all she had won in the West, while she could look forward to fresh conquests in the East.

And so with even greater confidence he foreshadows the permanent "freedom" of Poland from Russia, and in his peroration opens out the prospect of a new Europe firmly established on the victories of Germany.

"The war, the longer it lasts, will leave Europe bleeding from a thousand wounds. The world

that will arise then shall and will not look as our enemies dream. They strive for the restitution of the old Europe . . . with a powerless Germany as the tributary of a gigantic Russian Empire. . . . No, this gigantic world war will not bring back the old situation. A new must arise. If Europe is to come to peace it can only be by the inviolable and strong position of Germany. . . . The English balance of power must disappear, because it is, as the English poet Shaw recently said, 'a hatching of other wars.'"

We cannot read the last words without calling to mind former speeches made on the same spot by the greatest of his predecessors. Strange indeed it is to hear the successor of Bismarck appealing on the questions of international principle and policy to the amateur diplomacy of an English playwright, and one is sure that no one will have more readily recognised the full humour of the position than the entertaining author whom he quotes. It was not on such authorities that Bismarck depended when he dealt with questions of peace and war. But then he had spent a lifetime in studying the rules and principles of international relationships; the creation and dissolution of coalitions was to him the normal instrument of policy. To him the attitude of his successor would have been the incapacity of the clumsy workman who will in a fit of irritation throw away and destroy the machine which he is incapable of using.

And observe the subtle dishonesty of this comparison. He speaks of the contrast of two Europes—that before 1870 and a Europe of the future; a Europe with a divided and helpless Germany and a Europe in which Germany is the sole predominant Power. But there was another Europe which he does not mention—a Europe in which Germany took its place as one among the other kindred States—strong, united, self-governing, with full and complete opportunities for internal development, and able to share in the division and rule of other continents; but a Germany willing to keep its place as one of many equal Powers. There was such a Germany, the Germany of the 'eighties, the Germany which declined the very idea of further accessions of territory, the Germany which was a "saturated" State; it was a Germany which just for this reason enjoyed the confidence of other countries, and was exposed to no attack. And this Germany, when it naturally looked for colonial possessions, recognised that all extension of influence and territory must be the result of agreement and bargaining with the other Powers. And this Germany, based on the inviolable security at home, provided for its people a free scope for the unparalleled development of their institutions, both by growth at home and by free development abroad.

But much has changed since then.

At least we cannot complain that the pro-

gramme is obscure: the war is to be continued, as he concludes his speech, "till the road becomes free for the new liberated Europe, free of French intrigue, Muscovite desire of conquest, and English guardianship." So a new Europe will arise that is dependent entirely on Germany, a new Europe in which Germany will be so strong as to be unassailable, a new Europe which will be freed from the influence of England and France and Russia, and in which all nations will depend for their freedom on Germany, for "we are and will remain the shield of peace and freedom of large and small nations." This will indeed be a new Europe. There was an old Europe which we all knew, a free and equal federation of States and nations, joint inheritors of a common civilisation and common religion, in which each played its part and contributed its own share to the common life. Each is the guardian of its own traditions, and all profit by the contributions of the others. In this Europe no State can take its share unless it is assured of full and complete independence and political self-determination, for, as none know so well and tell us so often as the Germans, political sovereignty is the necessary condition for the development of internal culture. In the old Europe this independence and sovereignty were maintained by a highly artificial equilibrium which secures that no State can be deprived of its independence, for each can appeal to the protection of the common conscience. It

is the justice which, as we learn from Plato, is the union of the weak against the strong, and is the only protection against the tyrant or the tyrant State. It was a Europe in which, side by side with Germany and Austria, England, France, Italy and Russia each played its part, and in which the ruling and controlling force was to be found not in the arbitrary power of a single State, but in the result of the discussions, negotiations, and compromises between them all.

This Europe the Chancellor would destroy, and the announcement of his purpose he calls suggestions for peace. By the refusal to consider any such terms " our enemies," he says, " will incur a terrible blood-guiltiness."

We can picture to ourselves this new Europe which he will create in its place, this Europe freed from the English doctrine of the balance of power. We know it well: it was the Europe that Napoleon created. A Europe in which there is a single Emperor throned in his imperial city, surrounded by an obsequious band of subject and obedient princes, who attend and decorate his Court, and who at the call of war will lead out their armies to take their place by his side. A Europe in which the mineral wealth and manufacturing skill of the Poles and Flemings would be at the service of the German system as surely as if they were incorporated in one of the German States. If this were won, then indeed the war would not have been fought in vain by Germany,

and this is the aim which the Chancellor constantly puts before his people, disguised under the specious phrase " security." For why is this change from the old Europe to the new to be made? For the security of Germany. It is a high price we are asked to pay. Germany wishes to pursue her peaceful work of culture free from the menace of foreign invasion. It is a natural desire. It is what every State wishes, and that to which the policy of every State has been directed. It is an idea that should be attained by all. To a large extent it has, as a matter of fact, been won for England alone, and it is just for this reason that no other country can so well sympathise as can England with the desire of other States. We have often heard in the past of this security. It was for this that the Allies fought and won in 1814. It was then established by mutual agreement between the Powers, and by the system under which no one Power was so great that it could with impunity assail any other, and by so arranging the map of Europe that if any one State threatened the common security of the other, a coalition would quickly be formed by which this would be prevented. The settlement of 1815 gave security not to one but to all the nations, not only to the victors but to the defeated, to Prussia, to Austria, to Germany, and in an equal extent to France. The system was a complicated one, it seemed mechanical; but, in fact, as far as anything can be secured in a fabric so

imperfect and changing as political affairs, it answered its purpose. In bringing this about England took a chief part, and it has always been the object of English policy to help in maintaining the security, not of one, but of all nations.

But is this the German idea as put forward by the Chancellor? It is exactly the reverse. The English idea is security for all; the German solution is security for Germany and for Germany alone, and a security won by making Germany so strong that she can stand out against the whole of Europe. A Germany that could feel herself able to withstand the united public opinion of Europe is, however, a Germany which is able also to impose her will on each individual State. Germany is to be secure; but what about France? What about Russia? What about Italy? What about Holland? On what has this security of Holland in the past depended? On nothing but the knowledge that an attack upon Holland would involve war with England and with France, and Germany was not strong enough to encounter this danger. The terms of peace suggested by the Chancellor are definitely and categorically that Germany should be so strong that she would be able to look with indifference on an alliance not only of France and England, but of France and England supported by Russia and Italy.

IV

In this speech he still confines himself to generalities; he states the general objects to be attained, but does not specify the particular methods by which they will be won.

The next speech was delivered in December 1915, and in it he moves a step forward, though always with great caution. This is the one in which he himself tells us that we are to find his peace proposals. The debate during the course of which they were made had been carefully heralded in the Press. Great expectations had been aroused. New and great successes had been won. Serbia had gone the way of Poland and Belgium. The road to Constantinople had been cleared, and, except where the Allies clung to the narrow strip of land about Salonika, Germany and Austria were supreme in the Western Balkans. It was a great success, diplomatic as well as military, and it might well be the beginning of greater successes in the future; for, now that the connexion with Turkey had been established, what might not be done in the East? Egypt and Persia were open, and at last might it not be that a fatal blow might be struck at that which the Germans have come to think is the nerve-centre of the British Empire?

The Chancellor made two speeches. The first need not detain us. We need not grudge him the pæan over the victories that had been won, for

in truth they had been great, greater probably than had been anticipated; nor his pleasure at the diplomatic victories in the Balkans: *hæc olim meminisse juvabit.* Nor need we demur to his description of the strength of Germany as shown by the works of peace carried out behind the line of battle. It is no consolation to the Allies, nor will it help in an accommodation, that even during the time of war Germany's Civil Government is being firmly established over Belgium, and that the organisation of the Belgian schools has been made subservient to the cause of Teutonism.

In truth the natural delight expressed by the Chancellor in the achievements of the German people has a double edge. For, after all, the very strength of their armies and the degree of success which they have attained is the best justification of the cause of the Allies. Had it appeared that the German nation was not really prepared for a great offensive war, then the apprehensions caused by German ambition would not have been justified. Had the raid on Belgium shown itself to be a hasty improvisation undertaken in a not unnatural panic, then it might have been contended that the Triple Entente was an unnecessary, and therefore wanton, threat to German security. What we see is, in fact, a strength far greater than any one suspected, a degree of preparation which could only be explained on the hypothesis of a long-matured plan for conquest, worked out

in all its details during peace and carried out on an arranged programme. The Chancellor complains that the Allies refused to accept the verdict of the war and give way to the successes of the German Army; but does not he see it is the very success of Germany that makes peace impossible, unless the success is carried to that point where all possibility of resistance is broken down?

This speech was the preliminary. At an adjourned sitting it was followed by the real debate. This was opened by Herr Scheidemann, who spoke on behalf of the Socialist majority. If report is true, and we may well believe it, his interpellation had been arranged beforehand between his party and the Government. His speech was very remarkable and deserves to be remembered. He began by pointing out that a war of this kind differed from the normal war between small States; in the latter it might be possible for one party to declare itself defeated and therefore to beg for peace, but, he added, "in a war which involves nearly the whole of Europe it is impossible for one party to be forced down upon his knees," and he draws the conclusion that in such a war the first proposals of peace must come, not from the defeated, but the victorious nation. Germany so far has been victorious; it is therefore Germany which must speak the first word. He definitely rejected the common conception that to be the first to speak of peace was a sign of weakness.

On what terms, then, could Germany offer

peace? While repudiating any weakness as regards the voices in enemy countries which demanded the crushing and destruction of Germany, he equally dissociated himself from those Germans who ask for annexation:

"We will not conceal from ourselves the fact that in this country, too, claims of conquest have been put together which no sensible man in the Empire would think of realising. My party has always strongly opposed this. Abroad these claims were looked upon as sufficient reason for continuing the war. Annexation would weaken the sovereign rights of nations and, for Germany in particular, the strength and unity of the German national State. Our foreign political relations would thereby be seriously impaired. It would produce an increased danger of war and an addition to the burden of our armaments. We are, therefore, decidedly opposed to all who wish to convert this war into one of conquest."

In the following passage he is equally emphatic in his rejection of all claims against the German Empire and its security:

"It has been said abroad that there can be no question of peace until German militarism has been destroyed and Alsace-Lorraine given back to France. Our opponents' ideas of militarism differ from our own. By militarism we do not mean the Army in which our sons and brothers serve. What we combat as militarism is a matter to be decided only within the bounds of our own

country, just as French militarism and English navalism must be decided beyond the Vosges and the Channel. Of course, we will hear nothing of a separation from Alsace-Lorraine."

He concludes by pointing out that the danger to German integrity and independence is over:

"East Prussia has shown what was the extent of the Russian danger. There are now no longer any immediate dangers threatening our frontiers. It is, therefore, our duty to ask the Imperial Chancellor on what terms he is willing to negotiate for peace. The German nation will not wage war a day longer than is absolutely necessary to attain its ends. For the independence of our land our people will do their utmost, but for the special interests of capitalists it will not risk the life of a single soldier. When our comrades hastened to the standard, they did not do so to subject the world to the will of Germany, but to prevent our position as a country from being shattered by a tremendous hostile coalition. A peaceful people like the Germans can be unmanned by rage, but does not revel in thoughts of vengeance and destruction.

"We may publicly declare that we want peace because the Germans are strong and determined enough to go on defending hearth and home if our adversaries will not have peace. The whole world is waiting in breathless expectation for the Imperial Chancellor's reply. I hope he will find the word of salvation and express his readiness to make peace. Then to-day's parliamentary sitting will be an important one in history. We wish the

first decisive step towards the conclusion of this fearful war to be taken by Germany."

These were notable words. They afforded an opening on which it would, in truth, have been possible for the Chancellor to have done what he professes to have done, to have opened the way for some kind of negotiation. How were they met? We have a definite and categorical refusal both in form and in substance. Herr Scheidemann had made two points: first, that Germany, just because she had been victorious, could open the way for discussion; the second, that any terms which Germany might suggest should not include claims of conquest which would naturally strengthen the resolution of her enemies. Both suggestions were rejected. The Chancellor made a long and involved speech of which a large part was devoted to a violent attack upon England, but when at the end he comes to the real issue he has nothing to say. As to the first point he would not accept Scheidemann's suggestion. Germany could not offer terms: that was the function of the defeated. It was from the enemy that the first step must be looked for:

"So long as the tangle of guilt and ignorance continues amongst those in power among our enemies, and their intellectual attitude governs the hostile peoples, any offer of peace on our side would be folly, which would not shorten but would prolong the war. This we must take into

account. With peace suggestions on our side we shall not advance, and above all we shall not come to any result. Peace proposals of our enemies, which correspond to the dignity and security of the German Empire—I constantly repeat it—we are always ready to discuss."

The self-deception is that the enemy did not believe that they were defeated, that they did not recognise that the war was decided. No proposals, therefore, would be made by Germany in the capacity of victor. The Chancellor tells us that he will not refuse to consider offers that are made to him; so far his condescension will go. Like another Napoleon, he will not refuse to listen to those who come to him as suppliants for peace, and then he proceeds to tell us what the terms will be. The words are familiar, but we must quote them in full:

"It shall not be said that we have prolonged the war for a single day because we wished to conquer this or that additional pledge. In my earlier speeches I have explained the general aims of the war. I cannot go into details to-day. I cannot say what guarantees the Imperial Government will require—*e.g.* in the Belgian question, what foundation of power it will consider necessary for these guarantees. But one thing our enemies must see themselves: the longer and the more bitterly they wage war against us, the more will grow the guarantees that are necessary for us."

So far we have, then, the old conception of guarantees for the future greatness and security of Germany—guarantees which are to be based on an undefined increase of power. Then he proceeds:

"If our enemies will for all future time erect a barrier between Germany and the rest of the world, they cannot wonder if we also arrange our future on similar lines. Neither in the East nor in the West must our enemies of to-day dispose of gates through which they can fall upon us and threaten us more sharply than they have done in the past. It is known that France gave her loans to Russia only on the express condition that Russia should build her Polish fortresses and railways against us; and it is just as well known that England and France looked on Belgium as a starting-point for an attack on us. Against that we must protect ourselves politically, militarily and economically we must secure our development. What is necessary for this must be attained. I think that there is no one in the German Fatherland who does not desire these ends. What means are necessary for this end—on that we keep the decision in our own hands."

Now the Chancellor himself refers to this speech as the authentic expression of German peace terms. It is the only one that we have yet had. There is nothing in his later speech to alter them. Here he says nothing about Austria, the East, and the other fields of war;

he confines himself to that which immediately and solely affects Germany, and his terms are categorically that Poland and Belgium are to be brought under the commercial, military, and political control of Germany. How this is to be done he does not say; he does not commit himself to or against annexation; the future relations of Poland to Austria are for obvious reasons left untouched. But these are matters which do not concern the enemies of Germany; they are matters on which Germany will at her own good time give her decision. What does concern the Allies, and what especially concerns England, is that Poland and Belgium are in some form or another to be brought into the German system, so that Germany will have guarantees that for the future she shall have control over them.[1]

[1] In his latest speech, on September 29, 1916, the Chancellor has again referred to this speech as containing the authentic evidence of his willingness to make peace on reasonable terms:

"From the very first day the war meant for us nothing but the defence of our right to life, freedom, and development. For this reason we were the first and the only ones to declare our readiness for peace negotiations. On December 9 of last year I spoke of this clearly enough, and have since repeated it. Mr. Asquith and Lord Robert Cecil cannot do away with my words by the statement that we had announced no conditions of peace, or only such as were intolerable and humiliating. We have done our part."

The reader must judge for himself whether terms of peace which included the permanent control of Germany over Belgium answered to the description which the Chancellor gives of them, or whether Mr. Asquith and Lord R. Cecil are not justified in criticising them as "intolerable and humiliating."

In the circumstances in which it was made this speech was well devised. It gave a formula which enabled the Government to avoid committing itself to the party of the annexationists or opposing them. It was admirably suited to keep up the unity of the German nation, and at least for a time it answered that purpose; but what are we to think of the statesmanship of the man who months later refers to it as evidence of his willingness to make peace, who supposes that this formula may be the beginning of negotiations?

One can indeed imagine circumstances in which these terms would be a fitting basis for negotiations. If the German armies had occupied, not Lille and Warsaw but Paris and Moscow; if the English army had been defeated and was no longer able to resist the advance of the Germans; if a final decision had been given on the battlefield; if we were in presence of a victory such as that of 1866 or 1870; then indeed the Allies would have to consider the abandonment of all for the sake of which the war was accepted by them—the liberties of Europe, the security of France, and the integrity and independence of Belgium.

If we are to understand the full insolence of the Chancellor's language we must recollect that the one great question from which the war originated was the refusal of Germany to allow the other Powers to be consulted in a matter which had always been held to be a common

European concern; if the Allies were not strong enough to enforce the claim of Europe to be heard, then for all time it would be determined that there was to be only one voice heard in Europe. His conditions were therefore such as could naturally be suggested only after a complete defeat of the armies which left the enemy at the mercy of Germany. But these terms were propounded when no such defeat had taken place. He confounded a temporary strategical gain with a decisive victory, and when the struggle was at its height presumed to use the language of a conqueror. What a prospect does this hold out of the fate of Europe were there to be a real and decisive success for Germany!

It is then on this, and on this alone, that the claim made that he is working for peace is based. For to this his later speech which was made in April adds nothing, and from it takes away nothing. It is perhaps less explicit, it is perhaps more apologetic and less positive in tone, but on all that concerns the positive suggestions for ending the war there is nothing. As to Belgium, which is for Englishmen always the essential thing, we have indeed the additional suggestion that in any settlement Germany will have to guard the Flemings in the use of their own language from the oppression of the Walloons. But how can this be done if the independence and integrity of Belgium is to be restored? And he knows that there is no possibility of any discus-

sion except on the basis that the full restoration of Belgium is the first point.

"Gentlemen, Russia must not again march her armies for a second time to the unprotected frontier of East and West Prussia. Not for a second time must she be allowed, by the use of French gold, to make the land of the Vistula a sally-point against unprotected Germany. Can anyone believe that we will surrender the lines which we have occupied in the West, in which the blood of our people has flown, without complete security for our future? We will make for ourselves real guarantees that Belgium will not again become an English-French vassal-state, and that she shall not be built out as a military and economic bulwark against Germany. Here also there is no *status quo ante*. Here also Germany cannot surrender the Flemish race, which has so long been kept down, to Frenchification. We must secure for it a healthy, broad development, corresponding to its characteristics on the basis of its Low German (Niederländisch) speech and character."

Germany is to have real guarantees. What is meant by a "real guarantee"? Real guarantees—military, economic, and political. It is not to be supposed that the Chancellor would be content with the security merely of a treaty, neither a simple treaty nor a general treaty, nor the decision of a Conference ratified by all the Powers and enforced by formal guarantees.

These are the securities on which other States in the past have from time to time depended: the security of Germany is too precious to be allowed to rest on so frail and uncertain a basis. The currency of treaty obligations and of paper guarantees has been depreciated. After all, it might be that the time would come when some other nation might find itself in *a state of necessity*; it might be remembered that treaties have only a conditional application, that they disappear with changed circumstances, and so Germany must have her real guarantees.

What does he mean by this? The words can have no meaning, and, in fact, obviously are intended to have no meaning except that Belgium and Poland are to be brought under the political system of Germany, to be associated with the German commercial system and controlled by the German Army. The formula as to Belgium deserves attention; it is one of those unsurpassable suggestions in which the German Chancellor is supreme. They cannot allow that Belgium shall be a place from which France and England can begin their march against them. Belgium must no longer be a sally-port threatening the German Empire. Well, one would have thought that experience showed that Belgian territory was the base of operations, not against Germany, but against France. Who else in the world could, at less than a week's notice, have thrown a million soldiers into Belgium under the plea of

necessity, used Belgian territory as the base of operations for marching straight upon Paris, and then, with smug self-satisfaction, come before the public assembly of his own countrymen, and speaking, not only to them but to the whole of Europe, have seriously laid down the proposition that in future Belgium must not be used by France as the base of operations against Germany?

The Chancellor cannot tell us in what these guarantees are to consist. We are really not curious. The details do not matter. It does not matter in the least whether Belgium is annexed to the Empire or to Prussia or left in the enjoyment of its own dynasty and nominal and legal autonomy. It did not matter whether Saxony was annexed in 1866, as was Hanover, or allowed to remain a separate kingdom. It matters nothing whether a future King of Belgium enjoys the privilege of the Duke of Mecklenburg, or whether the Kingdom of Poland is to take its place among the seventeen territories over which the House of Hapsburg rules, or to be partitioned between Hapsburg and Hohenzollern. That which does matter is that these nations shall not come into the German system in such a way that their industry goes to swell the resources of Berlin, their armies fight by the side of the Prussians, and the development of their institutions is assimilated to those of Germany.

His last formula used in his speech of June 18,

1916, is the "geographical situation of the war map." Schemes of peace could only attain their object if carried on by statesmen of the belligerent countries on the basis of the military situation as shown by the war map. Well, the war map is a very serious thing, but it is not the same as the military situation, and peaceful though his career has been, little part though he may have taken in military affairs, he cannot be so ignorant of the writings of the soldiers of his own country as not to know the difference. That which tells in war is not the extent of territory occupied at any moment, but the number and efficiency of the armies which can be brought into the field on either side. So long as the forces of the enemy are able to keep the field intact, so long any territory occupied is only a precarious possession. And of the enemies of Germany there is not one except Serbia which is not in the field with an army, relatively, as regards the German forces, as strong as or stronger than when the war began.

The armies are still in the field, but he will make a peace as though they had disappeared, for that is what it comes to. Peace on the war map is another way of saying what he has said so often before. Peace on the assumption that Belgium and Poland and Serbia are not only occupied but conquered.

CHAPTER IV

PRINCE BÜLOW ON PEACE[1]

In a former article I discussed the attitude of the present German Chancellor towards peace, and attempted to show how little hope there was that from him we could expect any reasonable proposals. Since then we have had a contribution to the same question from one who is both a past, and—may we not add?—a possible future Chancellor. Prince Bülow is undoubtedly the most distinguished of living German statesmen; he is, above all, the man in whom the Bismarck tradition lives, he has held the office of Chancellor longer than any one since Bismarck's retirement, and it is not probable that a man of his experience and ability will be allowed to remain in retirement at a time when the country needs all that it has of the wisest leadership. If the time comes when Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg finds, as he easily may do, his position untenable, it is Prince Bülow who is clearly marked out to be his successor.

[1] *Nineteenth Century and After*, August 1916.

If doubt is felt in this by any one, it is certainly not felt by Prince Bülow himself.

For Prince Bülow's suggestions as to the terms of peace which may properly be imposed by Germany when victorious we have to turn to the new edition of his book, *Imperial Germany*.[1] With much that is contained in this work I am not here concerned. Most of it is occupied with a review of German history for the last twenty-five years and a defence of his own policy. But both in his Introduction and from time to time in the course of the new edition, he has introduced valuable suggestions for the future.

He is indeed in a very favourable position for doing so, more favourable than the Chancellor himself. He at least is free from the responsibility for the outbreak of the war; he therefore can approach the future with a free mind. Between him and the countries at war with Germany there has been no personal breach. There is nothing to prevent him meeting at the council-table the statesmen of enemy countries. And we may be grateful that he has observed throughout the book a discretion which is now too rare. He has kept himself free from the passion, the anger, the invective that are too common in all that comes to us from across the water. There is none of the heady indignation, the passionate invectives, the crude denunciation

[1] *Imperial Germany*, New and Revised Edition, Cassell & Co. Ltd., 1916.

of English hypocrisy and English brutality to which we are now so accustomed. There is criticism of the enemy countries, but criticism phrased in language which even those who differ from it cannot for a moment object to. We see indeed the desire to restore relations, even in the protest against the expression used by Lord Rosebery of *Judas kisses*. That the expression was a not unfair description of German policy, as expounded by the Prince himself, most Englishmen will believe. Here we need only note the obvious desire to resume the cool business tone which normally exists between the ministers of modern States even when they are most opposed to one another.

Indeed the note of the book is discretion and conciliation. It is the book of a man who will make himself *persona grata* to every country. For Italy there is regret that she so misunderstood her own interest as to leave her own Allies and trust herself to England.

"To avoid the breach between Italy and Austria lay especially in the interests of Italy. Will Italy get with her new Allies what she sacrificed by giving up the old? The greatest interests which Italy had, her Mediterranean interests, have always been looked on by England with cool indifference, by France with traditional jealousy, by Russia with scarcely concealed distaste."

This is the language of a friend who, though

grieved, is still at heart a friend. It is far from the wrath and revenge that generally is heard from Berlin. It is the language of a man who would make the reconciliation easy. It is the language of a man who hopes to sow dissension between the Allies, and who knows that more is to be won by conciliation than by indignation. Even Japan is not without the pale: "it will rest with her to win once more the confidence of the victorious German Empire." For the neutrals there are well-chosen words of kindness and sympathy. Except for America: "The anger which is so widely felt in Germany against the American people with whom they had such friendly feelings is only too natural and comprehensible." With America reconciliation will, it seems, be difficult.

The coolness and dispassionate tone are, however, not without a purpose. Prince Bülow has his eyes on the future, and again and again we find indications of the manner in which he hopes to treat the problems that will arise after the war. It would not be going too far to interpret the book as a bid for power, as a suggestion that it is in his hands that the peace negotiations would best be placed. There is not a word in it that would prevent him from taking up the thread of international problems; he would come to the task unencumbered by the passions that have been excited.

What, then, has this accomplished statesman,

this amateur of *Real-politik*, this pupil of Bismarck, to offer to the world when the time comes that he anticipates and Germany is called upon to announce the terms on which peace will be restored? It is all clearly explained. England, France, and Russia, each is dealt with in its place. They are set out with admirable courtesy; all is reasonable, so reasonable that we seem to share his belief that they are nothing more than the other countries might willingly offer of themselves. There is nothing of revenge, no waving of the sword, and if the mailed fist is there, and the shining armour, the mailed fist is clothed in a thick glove of satin, and the shining armour is hardly seen beneath the court dress of the diplomatist.

We have nothing of the crude arrogance of the Nationalists, of Count Reventlow and Herr Bassermann or the Crown Prince of Bavaria. We are spared the heavy denunciations of the Chancellor against the plans for the annihilation of Germany. He does not take as his text the uncritical collection of extracts from journalists and novelists which the German Foreign Office seems to keep as material for the time when the Chancellor has to make a speech. With him all is dispassionate reasoning; in fact, he makes his demands in such a way that we feel he expects that they will be assented to by the enemies of Germany. But different as the tone and attitude are, there is no difference in the substance.

What are his proposed terms? Let us take, first, England. From England he demands nothing less than that she should accept the "freedom of the seas" and a strengthening of the German coast-line.

"After a war that has been waged by the German people with incomparable heroism, but also with terrible sacrifices, against half the world, we have the right and also the duty to require, not only our own security and independence at sea, but above all a real guarantee for the freedom of the seas, for the further completion of our economic and political tasks in the world.

"Although after we had trod the road of world policy, we had often had England as an opponent, our relations to England, when we had attained the necessary strength at sea, could be genuinely and without reserve friendly. Just by the building of our fleet we had removed the chief hindrance to co-operation between us and England on the basis of full equality and mutuality, we had freed the road for an understanding between the two countries on all domains of world policy. The English ministers would not recognise this, they did not wish for an understanding, and did not desire a reasonable co-operation. Therefore they cannot be surprised if, in view of the unfavourable nature of our coast for security and independence, we demand from England serious and real guarantees."

Well, England would not be surprised at anything that Germany demanded, but we should

like to see translated into the prosaic language of a diplomatic instrument these suggestions. German independence at sea can in this connexion mean nothing less than a German superiority to England in naval strength; the insecurity of the German coast, whatever that may mean (it would have appeared that no country has a coast which by its geographical nature is so secure from attack as that of Germany), can only be remedied by the extension of German naval power over other parts of the coasts of the North Sea.

So it all comes to this: Germany was to build a fleet so strong that it would be a danger to England, and during the dangerous period of transition England was kept quiet by clever diplomacy. Then, when the fleet was built, England was to recognise that, as Germany was so strong that her enmity would be dangerous, she must enter into an alliance with Germany. As she did not do that, and a war has ensued in which Germany has, as will happen in a war, incurred severe losses, there is nothing for it but for England to acquiesce in German superiority, with all this means of danger to English safety.

The prospect held out to France is similar. France had always refused to acquiesce in the loss of Alsace-Lorraine. "There was no understanding of the fact that what seemed to them the brutal harshness of the conqueror was a national necessity for us Germans." Of course it was their duty to see that what Germany

thought was a national necessity for herself must therefore be accepted as the only right and proper solution by the French. They have not done this voluntarily, therefore they must be made to do so.

"Perhaps the French people will in the course of time adapt themselves to the decisions of the Peace of Frankfort when they see that they are unalterable, and especially if we succeed in confirming our strategic position as against France, which has always remained an unfavourable one."

It is all so simple and reasonable. Germany took Alsace and Lorraine; they were wanted by her, the nation demanded them; on this there is nothing more to say. In order to secure the booty, Metz was taken purely for strategic reasons. It was taken, as Bismarck said, because Moltke told him that in a war it would be worth 100,000 men. The French were, after all, not convinced. They are an emotional and idealistic race, they do not understand *Real-politik*; it is all very melancholy, but there is nothing to be done but to apply the same remedy in a stronger form. The frontier must be again altered, the weakness of France must be confirmed; they must give up their dreams. What is to be taken we do not know. Is it only Belfort, or is Nancy to be added? That matters little. It will be enough

to show the French their proper place in the world—and then things will go smoothly.

It is precisely the solution that every other German offers us. Wherever the experience of the war has shown that there is any weakness in the German strategic position, there this must be remedied. England at sea has advantages that Germany has not; they must be removed. France is indeed weaker than Germany, but the difference is not sufficiently marked; it must be made clearer.

Could we have clearer evidence than this that no satisfactory conclusion to the war can be given until it has been clearly shown that the Peace of Frankfort, a peace enforced on France purely by the power of the sword, is not unalterable? But there is another passage which shows in an even more remarkable manner the attitude of Prince Bülow, a passage which clearly indicates that on the great question of annexation or no annexation, he is to be found on the side of the extreme German Annexationists. I have dealt at length with the demands of the six Industrial Associations; their manifesto has become a sort of confession of faith which divides Germany, and it has been shown that the Chancellor has carefully refrained from expressing his approval of their demands. But Prince Bülow is to be found among those who have subscribed to their doctrines. He has, in fact, gone out of his way, quite unnecessarily for the

purpose of his argument, to express his general approval of their action:

"Turning to the international teaching of the world war and to the future position of the German Empire in the world, our six great Industrial Associations have joined together for a common manifestation of united and determined patriotic purpose, and have dealt with that question which is of the greatest importance for Germany's present and future, the question of the position of Germany as it emerges from the war in Europe and in the world, both in regard to political and industrial power. This constitutes a serious warning to foreign countries who reckon on the old party and industrial discords in Germany."

What this appears to mean is that their manifesto is to be a point of unity for all parties and all classes—a suggestion which is not indeed likely to reconcile foreign countries with the aims of united Germany.

So much for France; but Russia, too, must be weakened. Here, again, there is a right and a duty. It is always the duty of Germany to weaken her neighbours.

"There was perhaps no country that Russia so seldom found in her way as Germany. That has naturally altered since an enormous war has broken out between us and Russia."

We might have added that it had been altered since Germany embarked on an active policy in the Balkans which was in open opposition to that of Russia. We might have pointed out that it was Prince Bülow himself who in 1909 challenged Russia in the Balkans.

"We have now the right and the duty to demand a real guarantee that East Prussia, the province that in the course of centuries has suffered more than any other from foreign invasions, shall not again be exposed to barbarous devastation. King Ludwig III spoke from the heart of the Bavarian and German people when he said that we require a peace which will secure us rest for many decades. Such enormous sacrifices must not be made in vain. We require in the East a greatly increased and strengthened security, which in the nature of things can only consist in a correction of our unfavourable eastern frontier, a correction which protects us from further invasions."

It is the old story: Germany is to be secured from invasion on every side. Whatever wars take place in the future, this at least shall be secured—that they shall not be fought on the soil of Germany. This will be a holy land. When the new frontiers have been mapped out, then all will be well, for any future war will be fought on foreign soil.

The eastern frontier is of course the same thing as the Polish question. On this Prince Bülow

is a special expert. He had studied it in the school of Bismarck, and on it he speaks at greater length and in more detail than on most of these questions. One thing that emerges is that Poland is to be sacrificed. He has no solution but the old one—the continued partition of Poland, and the continued subjection of those Poles who fall to the share of Prussia to that process of Germanisation with which his administration was identified. He reprints the old chapter on the problem of the Eastern frontier, and asserts with full conviction that no course is possible except that of defending Germanism by expropriating Polish landowners and discouraging the use of the Polish language. This is a part of the German mission of *Kultur*. It is again "a national duty of the German people to itself."

"The struggle for the soil, which is in its essence the struggle for a sufficient stiffening of the East with German men, will always be the Alpha and Omega of our national German policy in the East. The struggle for German *Kultur* and culture, above all for the German language, must accompany it. With our plantation policy we fight for Germanism in the East, with our school policy in truth we fight for our Poles, whom we wish to bring nearer to German intellectual life."

Whatever may happen across the border the Prussian Poles are to remain Prussian and to be

Germanised. They are to have no part in the fortunes of their fellow countrymen. As he says again and again, "Prussia cannot allow Posen to become a second Galicia."

"The policy of the Eastern frontier is at bottom as simple as possible. Its solution is less a question of political wisdom than one of political courage."

In the Polish provinces of Prussia there is, then, to be no change. There will be added to them what is necessary to guard East Prussia against invasion. What is to happen to the rest of Poland? It is a question that does not interest him. He recognises that the result of the war might be the reconstruction of an independent or autonomous Poland, but he does not desire it. He does not desire it for the very sufficient reason that "it is a matter for consideration whether the separation of Congress Poland would mean a weakening of Russia," but it certainly would be a danger to Prussia.

"Were the world war to fulfil the dream of the Poles, were it to be that we really carried out for the Poles what they gained for a short time from our most dangerous enemy, Napoleon the First; and were, a hundred and fifty years after the Great King and the first partition, an independent or autonomous Poland to be created, then the indissoluble connexion between the Prussian monarchy and the Eastern provinces must be

secured with all the more resolution, the future of Germanism in the mixed districts be guarded all the more carefully and conscientiously. What the German sword has won for the Poles by German power and German blood must not, as a result, bring injury to the Prussian State and to Germanism."

He does not wish for a restoration of Poland in any form, and he quotes with approval a saying of Bismarck when discussing the possibility of a war with Russia:

"And what should we do if we had defeated Russia? Restore Poland? Then in twenty years we could have a new alliance between the three Empires in order to finish with a fourth partition of Poland. But this amusement is not worth a great war."

The Polish question is one which is necessarily outside the special interests of England, it is one in which she never has been, and never will be, able to exercise a decisive influence. On the one occasion when she attempted to interfere she did more harm than good. It has, however, been the hope of every Englishman that, whatever might be the result of the war, it would not fail to do much towards restoring to the Poles their nationality. Here at least it seemed that it could not be but that something would be achieved towards settling the most difficult of European problems.

It is clear that from Prince Bülow no help will be found. Russia must indeed be weakened. She must share the fate of France and England; but it is elsewhere that this must be done, not in Poland but in the Ukraine.

"Naturally also we cannot wish for a recuperation of the Russian Empire. We shall have to count on this, however, in view of the constant increase of the Russian population, and the national and religious homogeneity of the mass of the Russian people, unless Russia falls to pieces politically or socially, or loses the Ukraine, its corn store, and the basis of its industry.

The principle put forward—is it not a dangerous one? If Germany were after all not victorious, cannot we imagine, say, a French statesman quoting these words to their author at a peace congress? Could we not see him pointing out that France could not wish the recuperation of Germany, showing how in view of the yearly increase of the population and the homogeneity of the people this must inevitably come about, and that therefore, unless Germany fell to pieces, unless the Empire were dissolved, or a social revolution broke out, it would really be necessary to take away those Western provinces which were the basis of its industrial prosperity? For, after all, the sacrifices of the war have not been confined to Germany. It is not German soldiers alone that have fallen. There are widows and

orphans in France too. It shows less than his usual foresight, but it also shows in its barren nakedness the crude national egoism on which, despite the appearance of reason, is built up his whole political thought. In him, as in every German, there is no conception of any principle governing the relations between States beyond that of the eternal struggle—which, whether by war or diplomacy, shall do most injury to the other.

And this it is which will be the final verdict on him and his policy. It is not to him that we can look as to the *deus ex machina* who will rescue Europe from her present distress. This able statesman, this skilled and experienced diplomatist, this accomplished man of the world, what has he to offer us? There is no trick of the trade that he does not know; compared with him the Chancellor is, in fact, an inexperienced bungler. He has learnt to look at the States of Europe as pawns to be moved by the master hand, and he is never tired of explaining the admirable game that he played when it was for him to play. As it seemed to him, he knew, better than they themselves did, the true interests of every country in Europe; he could tell what was the right move for England, and how Italy should play. When the German fleet had been built, then of course there was nothing for England to do but to come into an alliance with a country which was now so strong that it could

not be her interest to be at enmity with it. And so the friendship of Germany was offered to England. Italy he knew as a second home, and he could see that the interest of Italy was to remain in the Triple Alliance; she would get more from it than from the other side.

And then the whole house of cards which had been built up with such care collapsed. England was offered the friendship of Germany; the two countries would indeed have had the world at their feet. But the friendship was offered at a price, the price of leaving those with whom we had been on the closest terms of friendship, and it was friendship with a country which openly boasted that they had beguiled us. It was an offer that required close scrutinising, and the answer was made: "We do not wish for new friendships at the price of sacrificing our old friends." One honest word dispelled all the mists and baffling clouds of poison gas. And Italy answered: "Yes, we should no doubt get much from you; we should get it at once and without a struggle; but by doing so we should for all time sacrifice our independence and our power of self-determination; we should be a mere vassal State of Germany. Better than this a contest, for even if we are defeated in it we shall have saved our honour."

Prince Bülow is indeed like the magician in the old story who found that unwittingly he had raised up dæmonic forces which he was unable to

control. In order to get the money to build his fleet he had to give the reins to the German Navy League, who would not put to their open hopes and ambitions the limits that were necessary if England were to be properly beguiled; and while he was explaining that, after all, the strong German fleet would be all to the good of England and would be the proper basis for friendly relations in the future, they with a foolish honesty insisted that it should be used to wrest from England the supremacy of the seas. To Serbia and Poland and Rumania he was as blind as was Metternich to the aspirations of Italy and Germany; he did not see that these national forces could not for all time be kept down by acute diplomacy and bargaining, nor even kept under by the soldier and the policeman.

And for Europe as a whole he has no message. So blinded is he by his admiration for Bismarck that he does not see how far the world has moved; he does not understand that that which was right and necessary in order to build up the German State, and to secure it during the first years of its existence, now belongs to the past. There has never entered into his mind a Europe different from that of the past. All he sees is a continuance of the old game of the rival Powers intriguing for place and power, with this difference, that in the future Germany is always to hold all the trumps. Even the German scheme of a Mittel-Europa, which at least is a real attempt

at construction, he passes over without a word. Still less has it occurred to him that there is possible a Europe in which, when each State has attained those frontiers which are necessary for the completeness of its national existence, the period of war and rivalry which belonged to the stage of formation may be over; that a Peace Congress should leave a state of things in which the ceaseless struggle for territory which has been the cause of so many wars should cease, at least in the West, and that the apportionment of territory and the guarantee for its continuance should not depend on the mere strength of the sword but on the verdict of the united Continent.

CHAPTER V

CENTRAL EUROPE [1]

I

THOSE who have studied the history of German political thought cannot fail to observe the ingenuity with which at each stage in the progress of the Prussian State there have been found historians and philosophers to proclaim the theory and principle by which it is justified. The aggression of the Government and the tyranny of war and the cruelty of organisation have to be properly decked out that they may take their place in high intellectual society. For the satisfaction of their own spirit they require a formula. The Prussian Government has never wanted priests and prophets. There was a time when we were told that the State was the end in itself, and the pupils of Hegel taught that its existence was its own justification. A generation passed, and the Prussian Government, which in 1815 had been the strongest enemy of the national idea, clothed itself in the fashionable doctrine of the time, and the conquest of Germany disguised itself as the unity of the German nation.

[1] *Westminster Gazette*, May 8, 1916.

The idea of nationality has been useful, and for forty years it has been proclaimed by the historian apologists of the Empire. But the idea of nationality will do no more. It imposes limits. It has been stretched to its uttermost by the Pan-Germans, but it has been stretched beyond its capacity. It involves a logical contradiction. The conception of nationality requires reciprocity. A State which is based on this idea cannot refuse to recognise the nationality of other States as equally justified. For a few weeks in the spring of 1848 this was recognised, and there was a time when the German patriots held out a hand of sympathy to the Poles and Italians and Hungarians. It was not for long, for the logic of facts showed that the recognition of other nationalities must lead to a diminution of German ascendancy. The achievements of 1866 and 1870 for a time freed the German nation from the necessity of thinking. They had gained sufficient for the moment; the absorption and incorporation of what had been achieved sufficed for a generation; the catchword of nationality, of the National-Staat, would suffice. But the success which they have gained in this war opens out further ambitions. German Kultur is no longer merely the expression of the full consciousness of German nationality. It is a sacred positive truth, world-wide in its application, to which other less favoured nations have to bow. But the imposing of German Kultur upon them is obviously a diminution of

their own national self-consciousness. The work cannot be carried out under this category. And so we find that the most thoughtful of modern Germans tell us that nationality has played its part, and that now its exaggerations must be curbed, for the principle of nationality means the dissolution of the Austrian Empire, and the greater Germany of the future depends for its security on an alliance with an Austria stronger and greater than before; "the national democratic fever must be subdued"; "it is a destructive element." To subdue it would be an enormous gain in peace and security. It must give way to the idea of German freedom.

It is the exposition of this new attitude that gives its interest to Herr Naumann's book, *Mitteleuropa*,[1] one of the most important contributions to political thought that has appeared since the war began. Herr Naumann, who has long been known as a prominent exponent of Christian Socialism, is no mere chauvinistic rhetorician; he takes a place apart from the mob of pamphleteers who repeat with vacant uniformity the virtues of Germany and the crimes of England. He does not merely require the world to accept German Kultur, he explains to us what it is, and he paints in firm outline the new Europe —for of course, like the Chancellor, he wants a

[1] *Mitteleuropa*, von Friedrich Naumann. Berlin, 1915: Druck und Verlag von Georg Reimer. There is now an English translation, published by P S. King & Co

new Europe—which it is to produce. For it is on German Kultur and not on German nationality that the new world is to be built up.

This is not the place for a full examination of the principles of Naumann's book. Those who are interested in these things will find much that is stimulating in his discussion as to the essential characteristics of German culture. On the Continent discussion has been chiefly confined to the economic questions involved, and there has been a serious consideration of the practical difficulties in bringing about any permanent commercial union, first between Austria and Hungary and then between the Dual Monarchy and Germany. This concentration on one element of the problem is misleading and dangerous. It obscures what is even more important—the political questions at stake. For though the new State which he desires is to be erected on an industrial basis, it is to be something much broader in its effects than this, and it implies nothing less than a permanent transfiguration of the whole of Europe.

That which at this moment alone is important are the practical results which he advocates. In them, though his formula is different, there is nothing to choose between him and the craziest of the Germano-maniacs or the headstrong fire-eaters of the *Kreuz-Zeitung* and the *Hamburger Nachrichten*. What he wants and what he hopes to attain is a Europe which would be completely

subject to Germany, and his whole book is an explanation as to how this is to be brought about. It matters nothing that it is to be done in the name of organisation rather than nationalism, that the new State is to be called Central Europe and not Germany, that he talks more of bankers than of armies; the essential thing is that he postulates a new Europe, a new Europe that is to be governed from Berlin. But the Allies do not intend to have this new Europe; they prefer the old.

What is the new Europe to be? The kernel is a permanent union between Germany and Austria-Hungary, a union commercial, political, and military. It is not to be a mere treaty arrangement, but an organised federal union with common institutions. There is to be a common army, a customs union, and common commercial policy, and, what is even more important, common industrial legislation. This is more important; for it means common legislation on the details of life which will affect the habits of each individual. The whole industrial organisation of the German Empire, improved and adapted where necessary, will be applied to all the constituent States. The committees and public offices by which this will be done will therefore have a control over the economic conditions which will put each individual in complete subjection to them.

In explaining his point of view, Naumann does

not scruple completely to throw over the whole doctrine of German nationalism, and to pour contempt on the suggestion that the war was one merely for the defence of the German nation. It is, he tells us, "a mistake to speak of this war as a decisive struggle between Germans and Slavs." They have to give up singing "Deutschland, Deutschland über Alles." They have to remember that they have non-Germanic allies. It is no good to continue laying stress on the national idea. "The highest temperature of the struggles of nationalities is past." "After the war there will have to be a great revision of methods, with relaxation of the Germanising force." "The Germans are bad Germanisers." "How pleasing it would be for us to make the Czechs into Germans, if we could; but it is simply impossible," and so we must talk less of nationality. These matters must be put into the background; they are of secondary importance. They must give way to the State-forming principle of the future, and that is organisation.

But let us not be deceived: all this might lead us to think that this European State of the future was to be an equal federation of equal races. No one who knows his Germany would believe that for a moment. When we say that nationality is no longer the creative force of the future, we only mean that it is not to be the creative force for the Poles and the Hungarians and the Czechs and the Croatians. They have

to recognise that these ideas belong to the past in order that they may be brought into the great mid-European State; but here it comes out nakedly and boldly: "Mittel-Europa will in its kernel be German; it will, of course, use the German language as the medium of communication." It is true there is to be concession to the languages of all races which have their part in it, but these would be subordinate and local languages; they would be as Welsh or Gaelic are with us, and will accept, with proper humility, their subordinate position as local dialects in the great State, which will be, in its heart and essence, German. On the Continent of Europe, from Constantinople to Antwerp, and from Riga to Trieste, there would be one great organisation, one army, one financial and commercial system, and this will be German.

An admirable picture, an enticing future, but will these small, inferior, and secondary races accept it? Will the Poles and the Hungarians acquiesce in a future which condemns them inevitably to be absorbed into the great Germany of the future, in which their own language, their own traditions, and their own culture will be irrevocably condemned to a gradual and passionless extinction? They will remain with the peasant costume and quaint local customs, to be visited by the antiquarians of the future who wish in the dead monotony of this commercial State to find the dying remnants of the old days

in which there still were separate races in Europe. Are they willing to look forward to a future in which they will be but as the few Wendish peasants who still maintain their language among the marshes and forests of the Spreewald, and provide wet nurses for the children of their German masters?

What are to be the limits of the new State he does not tell us. He is debarred from discussing this by the prohibition of any writing on the conditions of peace. He is, however, quite decided that it is not to be confined to the two great Central Powers. Their union is to be the nucleus to which the other lesser States of Central Europe are to be attracted.

"In order to understand the central problem we must keep in mind the explanations as to the extent of the industrial territory. Industrial Central Europe must be larger than the present territory of Germany, Austria and Hungary. We have, owing to the military situation, refrained from naming definite neighbouring States, and have only dwelt on the general idea that there must be further additions."

His contention is that first the union with Austria-Hungary has to be completed, and then this will be followed by the adhesion of other countries. Which these countries will be he leaves an open question; he warns his readers against the exaggerated hopes of some of his

countrymen, but he leaves no doubt that extensive additions are necessary, and will be secured, and the complete picture of Central Europe, as we can gather it from his words, is a State as powerful, as dominant as any of the dreams of the most uncompromising Pan-Germans; it is, in fact, greater, for by giving up the formula of Germanism he in reality gives up what must be a limiting condition. To an enlarged Germany there must be limits, for, after all, no one can maintain that the whole of Central Europe is Germanic; to a new State governed and directed from Germany, but one which definitely takes no account of nationality, the binding force of which is the commercial and industrial union, no limit need be placed.

And so he asks the question: "Whom shall we invite to enter the union?" But he does not answer it; for this is "a section of our work over which more than over any other the word 'caution' is written, for we are in the midst of war, and for very sufficient reasons must not publish anything on 'Kriegsziele,' in the ordinary sense of the word." But we have a warning against the exaggerated hopes which are not uncommon in Germany, a warning which is a useful criticism on the statements of those who, like the Chancellor, are never tired of telling us that the Germans are fighting merely for safety and security. "There are, indeed, in Germany, as in other parts of Europe just now, a number

of people who place no restraint on their unbridled imagination, and speak as though they had entrusted to them, as a secondary duty, the administration of Holland, Scandinavia, Rumania, Bulgaria, Greece, and the Turkish Empire, and only need write the names of these countries down on paper in order to bring them into the domain of Central Europe. Yes, there are bold thinkers who will at once bring in Switzerland, France, Spain, and, after a short period of purification, even Italy, and then found the United States of Europe with or without Belgium."

If he does not categorically answer his own question, at least he gives us, with all discretion, an indication of how he would answer it, and the possibilities which he opens show what is reckoned as moderation in Germany.

"The territory of Germany and Austria-Hungary, as it lies before us shut off by the war, is, of course, not sufficient as an industrial province, for it is in far too high a degree an importer of food and raw material, and already is dependent in much too great an extent on industrial exportation to be able to maintain itself by its own exertion even in the chief articles. A Central Europe that is to be self-sufficient requires bordering agricultural districts, and must make their adhesion possible and desirable to them; it requires, if possible, an extension of the northern and southern sea-coast, it requires its share in colonial possessions. But how can we speak of all these things without intruding on investiga-

tions as to neutrality or the coming negotiations of the Peace Congress? Whether and in what condition we shall get back our colonies by exchange at the peace no man can say. In our opinion we must not let ourselves be robbed of our colonial activity at any price, and, if it is unavoidable, must make concessions of the land we have occupied in order not to cease to be a colonising nation. And who can say how, after the war, the future lines of trenches will run through Central Europe? Will they run on this or the other side of Rumania and Bessarabia? Will they follow the Vistula? Is Bulgaria to be counted as belonging to the sphere of interest of Central Europe? Shall we gain a railway line to Constantinople, placed safely in the hands of our Allies? What harbours on the Mediterranean will come into consideration as the terminus of the Central European railway lines? What is to happen to Antwerp? How will the Baltic look after the war? There are a hundred questions the answer to which is still to come."

Well, Naumann is a wiser man than many of his countrymen. He knows that it is not enough to state what you would like to get; a premature publication of their demands will do more harm than good; there is a virtue in silence and reserve. But he clearly indicates where his desires go. This new State will be well endowed. He will not mention Switzerland or Holland, for that would raise difficult questions of neutrality; he is not sure where the boundary is to be drawn in Poland—at the Vistula or at the

marshes of Pribjek; which Mediterranean ports will come in we do not yet know, whether it will be Salonica, or Vallona or Smyrna; and they cannot be sure that they will secure Bulgaria and Rumania and Bessarabia, or whether the gain will be in the Baltic provinces of Russia. The details of the picture are not complete, but the general idea is there, and in its essential features it does not differ from that of the Pan-German writers whom he repudiates—a Germany ruling all Central Europe and choosing the districts that are to be included on the sure ground of their commercial and industrial value.

II

Central Europe will not be national; it will only be the rule of Germanism. It will not be peaceful; for it will primarily be organised for war. Neither will it be free. Only children and dreamers will believe that this new organisation will find any place for parliamentary government or democratic control. We have to picture to ourselves, as Naumann points out, a gradual separation of the new industrial and military State from the old national States; this will have its own institutions, and will administer the common affairs.

Now, how will these common affairs be controlled? Not by a separate parliament, but by special Commissions consisting of experts ap-

pointed by the constituent States. The work of those Commissions, and that means the whole government in all that concerns the highest and essential functions of the State, will be concentrated in a new bureaucracy.

"If such important departments of life as customs, provisions, the administration of war loans, the control of trusts and syndicates, are made the subject of Central European treaties and Commissions, then there will remain indeed the final approval to the Parliaments, but it cannot be maintained that they will not be excluded from practical participation in them more than has been the case hitherto."

Naumann adds, quite justly, that even now the influence of parliaments on these matters has in fact been small; in particular, commercial policy has become highly technical, and no member can understand all the details of commercial life. The withdrawal of these matters from parliamentary control will then only be the continuance of a tendency that has already begun: democratic control has shown itself ineffective, and it is quite natural that it should be diminished. And as for commercial affairs, so also for military and naval. Central Europe will be a single military union: "In this there lies for all the States that take part in it a certain limitation of their own policy, for they give up waging war alone. In this limitation there is at the same time contained a powerful protection

of their existence, for they are no longer exposed to being attacked alone. Whoever belongs to the military union is thereby secured as far as lies within the power of the common army."

We have, then, our Union, commercial, industrial, and military, with common institutions managing these great departments of public life which are withdrawn from the administration of the individual States, just as in modern Germany they are withdrawn from the administration of Saxony or Baden. In Germany they are in the hands of the Imperial administration, with which is coupled the Reichstag elected by universal suffrage. Well! The Reichstag has not been able to establish control over the administration as has the English Parliament, but none the less it has been able to exercise what has often been a very inconvenient, because effective, criticism. And it has always exerted a real control over the provision of money. New laws cannot be passed and new taxes cannot be levied without its assent, and had it not been there the Government of Germany would have been very different. There would have been no power able to curb the Prussian bureaucracy, the Court, the landed classes, and the great financial interests. There would have been no workmen's protection, for there would have been no socialistic party to be combated and appeased. What is proposed—and it is an inevitable result of the Union of Europe—is a German Empire without a Reichstag.

In this enlarged Empire who will govern?

First will come military matters, for it will be on the army that it will rest, as it was by the army that it was created. This army will be one raised by universal and compulsory enlistment, but the conditions of service, the size of the army, the discipline, will be controlled on purely military considerations, and there will be no parliamentary assembly constitutionally qualified to discuss and criticise. In the hands of these central authorities will next be placed the full control of imports and exports, all that concerns the daily food of the people, the organisation of industry, and the conditions of labour; but there will be no central parliament with its representatives of all classes who can voice their hardships and demands. All will be in the hands of the expert and the specialist. And who are the experts and specialists? In military matters they are the General Staff and the War Office; in commercial affairs they are the great Jewish bankers. Naumann tells us in so many words that it is to the Jews that he looks to help in the introduction of German commercial habits to the more backward countries, such as Hungary. And in this society a place will be found, as soon as the destruction of the British Empire has made way for the "freedom of the seas," for the managers of the great shipping firms.

Well, we can easily imagine this great State of the future, a State in which military power

prepares the way for commercial efficiency, in which all production is controlled by the great financiers working through the constitutional and orderly channels of a highly trained and obedient bureaucracy, in which a close tariff provides that the Union shall be self-sufficing and not dependent on trade with other countries. But in this new political condition what place will there be for freedom, and what for democracy? The soldier who has risked his life in the trenches, as he was taught, for the security of Germany, the father who has lost his son, and the woman her husband, will see that what they fought for is not the permanence and security of the old Germany that they knew and loved, a Germany in which a fresh step had been made to smooth away the inequalities of rank and condition, but the establishment over Germany of a new and autocratic Government which will for all time remove the prospect that the simple German citizen will have any real share in the control of the conditions of his own life. He will come back to a State in which the pressure of military service will not be relaxed, but it will now not be service in defence of the Fatherland, but of a cosmopolitan State in which his own labour will be exposed to the competition of Slovenians and Poles.

The danger to liberty is indeed far greater than we thought. Modern Germany would join together in one fabric of rule the three great elements which control man—the military State,

capitalism, and the organisation of industry. The army, the trade union, and the organisation of finance and capital—in England we have them all, but they are independent of one another, and to a large extent even hostile; each therefore neutralises the other. The system which Germany wishes to impose on Europe, and which it will impose unless it is defeated in this war, is one in which the same State which men serve in the army will, in its care for the well-being of the working man, govern each detail of his working-day, and in its support of industry be able to manipulate the prices of each article of food and clothing; and this State will be freed from all popular control—it will be a great syndicate of bankers, and it will have under its orders an army twice the size of the German army that we know.

The value to Germany of this scheme is that it shows clearly that annexations are unnecessary as a means to the establishing of German dominion. It gives a guide which may be of real use to an adroit politician. It is on annexation that the controversy with the Socialists turns, and a crude policy of annexation, of the kind which the noisy politicians demand, would revolt the moral sense of the world. But why not get the same ends without using the word? Give back her independence to Belgium, set up an autonomous Poland, restore perhaps even the shadow of her national existence to Serbia, and

maintain the alliance with Bulgaria, but let the independence and the autonomy be conditional on the conclusion of an alliance with Germany and Austria by which the armies of the subject States are obedient to the orders that come from Berlin, in which the ports are open to German ships of war, and see to it that the next war shall be fought not on the German frontier, but on the frontiers of these subject principalities. Circle them with a barricade of trenches, so that no hostile army shall ever be able to advance over their territory, and Germany will be safely cushioned, and the rude shock of war would fall, not on Cologne and Danzig, but on Antwerp and Warsaw.

It is not merely by annexations that the great empires of the world have been built up. Rome, when she conquered Italy, did not annex it, nor did England begin by annexing India. That is a later stage, that comes when the memory and desire for independence have disappeared; till then the half-way house of a semi-federal union will suffice.

A careful reading of the Chancellor's speeches will show that Dr. Naumann has in him a sympathiser. What the Chancellor has again and again demanded is not annexations, but guarantees—guarantees for the security of Germany, guarantees political, military, and commercial. These are precisely Naumann's requirements. But this way of putting the case creates an

impression of moderation, and might easily mislead the inexperienced, either in England or in other countries, to believe that here we really had suggestions on which a permanent and just peace might be made.

If this is the future which Professor Naumann paints for us, that of Professor Troltsch does not differ from it :

"For the moment we have a pledge of these hopes in the mutual relations of the Central States to one another. Here we have not so much an idealistic hope, as the requirements of practical policy. But if we succeed in forming a great Central-European block, with this there arises the idea of hope that this conception of the peoples based on the German idea of freedom may grow beyond it, and attract other States also to it. Then there would be freedom and also peace, at least for as far as we can see."

Here it is again the same idea, the Central European States attracting to themselves, but, of course, in proper subordination, the surrounding nations. In the mind of a German idealist, this takes a peaceful and generous form. But it is not by men such as he that the course of the world is governed, and we know that the attraction of the surrounding nations will be managed in the way in which it has been applied to Poland, to Belgium, and to Serbia.

All this is indeed but an outward garnishing and decoration. In England, which is governed

by Parliament, and where every turn of thought and every suggestion of an idealist finds its proper place in the groove of that public opinion, by which the State is governed, we can always look confidently to the future, certain that the crude exaggerations of war time, the violences of military necessity, and the crudities of bellocratic organisation will be softened and ameliorated by the constant stream of criticism and discussion. In Germany we know that this will not be the case; there we know that the great machine, always growing in perfection and in weight, will proceed on its way, careless of the talkers and the thinkers who will run by the side and behind, finding theories and ideas to justify every action that it takes. This machine in the future will be infinitely stronger and more self-possessed than in the past. They are only children who believe that success in this contest will lead to any relaxation of the governmental control or increase of democratic influence in the State. All that the Germans now demand is more and more organisation, greater and greater efficiency. This organisation and efficiency will not be won by parliament or the people; it will be won by the skilled and educated governing aristocracy of the intellect. To this great machine all the strength of the nation will contribute, but the nation will not guide or control it, and this Germany of the future will be associated in intimate alliance with the revived Turkish

Empire. Foreign policy always reacts upon internal affairs. This the Germans know well from their own past; it was the alliance with Russia and with Austria which crushed the free development of Germany for a generation. Will the Germany which is occupied with setting up a military rule in Asia and transporting to another continent the chosen plan of financial organisation and military power, which is preparing for the next great struggle with the British Empire, which is laying down railways in Asia Minor and Mesopotamia, forcing Turks and Arabs and Syrians and Bulgarians to take their place as the servant of the state machine; will this German government tolerate the amateur criticism of parliamentary parties and the crude individualism of romantic seekers after freedom?

APPENDIXES

APPENDIX I

MANIFESTO OF THE SIX INDUSTRIAL ASSOCIATIONS [1]

[*Strictly Confidential*]

THE League of Agriculturalists (Der Bund der Landwirte), The German Peasants' League (Der Deutsche Bauernbund), The Committee of the Christian German Peasant Union, formerly the Westphalian Peasant Union (Der Vorort der Christlichen Deutschen Bauernvereine, zurzeit Westfälischer Bauernverein), The Central Association of German Industrialists (Der Centralverband Deutscher Industrieller), The League of Industrialists (Der Bund der Industriellen), and The Conservative Middle-class Association (Der Reichsdeutsche Mittelstandsverband), on May 20, 1915, addressed the following petition to the Imperial Chancellor:

To His Excellency the Imperial Chancellor,
Dr. Bethmann von Hollweg.

BERLIN,
May 20, 1915.

EXCELLENCY,

Together with the whole German people, those occupied in business pursuits, whether in agri-

[1] This is translated from the original text published by the Alliance Française. The italics are as in the original.

culture or industry, in trade or manufacture, are determined to endure to the end, notwithstanding every sacrifice, in this struggle for life and death which has been forced upon Germany, in order that Germany may come out of this struggle stronger in its external relations, with the guarantee of permanent peace, and therewith also the guarantee for the security of further national, industrial and intellectual development, at home also.

Even if the military situation were a more unfavourable one, or were doubtful, this would make no difference, if the object which His Majesty the Emperor has himself put before us, both externally and internally, is not to be lost. This object can only be attained by fighting for a peace which will bring us better security for our frontiers in East and West, an extension for the foundations of our sea power and the possibility of an unchecked and strong development of our industrial resources; in short, both in politics, in the army, in the navy and in industry, those extensions of power which will be a guarantee for our greater strength externally.

The peace which does not bring us these results makes a renewal of the struggle unavoidable under circumstances which would be essentially less favourable to Germany. *Therefore no hasty peace.* For from a hasty peace we could not hope for a sufficient prize of victory.

But also no half-hearted peace, no peace which does not include complete political exploitation of the military successes, for which we hope in the directions indicated.

The following memorandum, which was drawn up on March 10 of this year by the League of Agriculturists, The German Peasants' League, The Central Association of German Industrialists, The League of Industrialists and the Conservative Middle-class Association, and addressed to Your Excellency,

and to which the Christian German Peasants' Union, which is also a signatory to this address, has been added, explains in detail the requirements which—the necessary military successes being assumed—must in the opinion of the undersigned Associations be fulfilled in order to secure for Germany that political, military and industrial position which would enable her to look with satisfaction to all possibilities of the future.

The memorandum was as follows:

"The undersigned Corporations have occupied themselves with the question of how the formula, which has in the last months so often been heard, viz.: *that this war must be followed by an honourable peace which corresponds to the sacrifices which have been made and contains in itself a guarantee for its continuance*, can best be realised.

"In answering this question, it must never be forgotten *that our enemies continuously announce that Germany is to be annihilated and struck out of the rank of the Great Powers.* In view of these attempts we shall find no protection in treaties, which, when the fitting moment comes, would be again trodden under-foot, BUT ONLY IN A WEAKENING OF OUR ENEMIES, BOTH INDUSTRIALLY AND MILITARILY, CARRIED TO SUCH AN EXTENT THAT BY IT PEACE WILL BE SECURED SO FAR AS CAN BE FORESEEN.

"Side by side with the demand for *Colonial Empire*, which completely satisfies the many-sided industrial interests of Germany, side by side with the security of our future in matters of *customs and commerce* and the requirements for sufficient war indemnity to be given in a suitable form, *we regard the chief end of the struggle* which has been forced upon us as lying in the security and improvement of the foundations for the European *existence of the German Empire* in the following directions:

"BELGIUM

"In order to provide the necessary security for our influence at sea, in order to secure our future military and industrial position as against England, and in order to bring about the close connexion of Belgian territory, which is industrially of such importance, with our main industrial districts, Belgium must be SUBJECTED TO THE GERMAN IMPERIAL LEGISLATION, BOTH IN MILITARY AND TARIFF MATTERS, AS WELL AS IN REGARD TO CURRENCY, BANKING AND POST. Railways and canals must be incorporated in our transport system. In addition the Government and Administration of the country must be so managed that the inhabitants obtain no influence on the political fortunes of the German Empire; there must be a separation of the Walloons and of the predominantly Flemish territory, and the industrial undertakings and landed property, which are so important for the Government of the country, must be transferred into German hands.

"FRANCE

"SO FAR AS REGARDS FRANCE FROM THE SAME POINT OF VIEW AS OUR POSITION TOWARDS ENGLAND, THE POSSESSION OF THE COASTAL DISTRICTS BORDERING ON BELGIUM, AS FAR AS THE NEIGHBOURHOOD OF THE SOMME, AND WITH THEM ACCESS TO THE ATLANTIC OCEAN, MUST BE REGARDED AS A VITAL MATTER FOR OUR FUTURE POSITION AT SEA. The 'Hinterland,' which must be acquired with them, must be so delimited that the complete use of the canal-ports which we gain, both for industrial and strategic purposes, must be secured. All further acquisitions of French Territory, apart from the necessary annexation of the mining district of Briey, must be determined purely according to military and strategical considerations. After the experiences of this war,

it must be regarded as a matter of course that we must not in the future leave our frontiers open to hostile invasion, as we should do if we left to our opponents those fortified positions which threaten us, and in particular Verdun and Belfort and the part of the Western slopes of the Vosges which lies between them. With the acquisition of the line of the Meuse and the French coast to which the canals lead, and the mining districts of Briey, which have been mentioned, the possession of the canal districts in the department of the Nord and the Pas de Calais is necessarily included. It is a matter of course, after our experiences in Alsace-Lorraine, that these annexations be based on the condition that the population of the annexed districts shall not be placed in the position to exercise political influence on the fortunes of the German Empire, and THAT INDUSTRIAL ESTABLISHMENTS, INCLUDING BOTH LARGE AND MODERATE-SIZED PROPERTIES, SHOULD BE TRANSFERRED TO GERMAN HANDS, WHILE FRANCE SHOULD COMPENSATE AND TAKE OVER THEIR OWNERS.

" RUSSIA

" For the East the determining consideration must be that the great addition to our industry in the West must be counterbalanced by an equivalent annexation of agricultural territory in the East. The present industrial structure of Germany has shown itself so fortunate in the present war, that the necessity for maintaining it for as long a time as we can foresee may well be termed the general conviction of our people.

" The necessity of strengthening also the sound agricultural basis of our nation, of making possible a German agricultural colonisation on a large scale, as well as the restoration to the territory of the Empire, and to our industrial system, of the German peasants who are living abroad, especially those

settled in Russia and at present deprived of their rights, and of strengthening and raising the numbers of our population capable of bearing arms, REQUIRES A CONSIDERABLE EXTENSION OF THE IMPERIAL AND PRUSSIAN FRONTIERS IN THE EAST BY ANNEXATION OF AT LEAST PARTS OF THE BALTIC PROVINCES AND OF THOSE TERRITORIES WHICH LIE TO THE SOUTH OF IT, while keeping in mind the object of making our Eastern German frontier one capable of military defence.

"*The reconstruction of East Prussia requires a better security of its frontiers by placing in front of them considerable districts, and also West Prussia, Posen and Silesia must not remain frontier marches exposed to danger as they now are.*

"With regard to the granting of political rights to the inhabitants of the new districts and the securing of German industrial influence, that applies which has already been said about France. The war indemnity to be paid by Russia will have to consist to a large extent in change in the proprietorship of the soil.

"THE GROUNDS FOR ANNEXATION

"*Of course these demands depend on the hypothesis that military results will enable them to be carried out.* In accordance with what we have already achieved, we have firm confidence in our army and its leaders that a victory will be secured which will guarantee the attainment of these ends. These ends are to be put before us, not from a policy of conquest, but because it is only the attainment of these ends which will secure the permanent peace, which, after the great sacrifices which have been made, the German people in all its branches expects, quite apart from the fact that, according to our view, a voluntary surrender of the hostile territories which have been watered with so much German blood, and in which are found

innumerable graves of the very best of our people, would not correspond to the feeling of the people and their conception of an honourable peace.

" In the future as in the past, the want of harbours directly on the Channel would strangle our activity beyond the seas. An independent Belgium would continue to be a *tête du pont* to England, a point from which to attack us. The natural line of fortifications of France in the hands of the French implies a permanent menace to our frontiers ; and Russia, if she emerged from the war without loss of territory, would despise our capacity for action and the power which might check her in disturbing our interests, while on the other side the failure to attain agricultural territories on our Eastern frontier would diminish the possibility of strengthening the defensive power of Germany against Russia by a sufficient increase of the German population."

As a supplement to this manifesto, we must here lay special stress on the fact that the political, military and industrial objects which the German people must strive after in the interests of the security of their future, stand in the closest connexion with and cannot be separated from one another. It is clear, to start with, that the attainment of our great political objects depends on the offensive power and the successes of our army. There can, however, be no doubt, particularly after the experiences of this war, that our military successes and their exploitation in a wide field is conditioned by the industrial strength and active power of our people, and this especially if we take a long view. If German agriculture had not been in a position to secure the food of the people despite all the efforts of our enemies, and if German industry, German inventing spirit and German technical skill had not been in the condition to make us independent of foreign countries

in the most different spheres, then, notwithstanding the brilliant successes of our victorious troops, we should have eventually had to give way in the struggle which had been forced upon us, if indeed we should not have already been defeated.

In a very special manner this applies to the requirements put forward in the Memorandum, on the one side for the acquisition of territory suitable to agricultural settlers, and on the other side for seizing the mining district of the Meurthe and Moselle as well as of the French coaling districts in the Departments of the Nord and the Pas de Calais and also the Belgian.

We cannot do without the acquisition of sufficient territory suitable for agricultural settlement, both in the interests of the extension of the agricultural foundations of our national industry, and included in this, the maintenance of that happy balance in our whole industrial system which has been recognised as so necessary in the present war, and also for the security of the source of the national strength of our people, and especially the increase in the numbers of the population which flows from a vigorous agriculture and which strengthens our military power.

In the same way, acquisitions such as that of the mining and coal districts which have been spoken of, are not only in the interests of the development of our industrial forces, but also represent the military interests.

The security of the German Empire in a future war also imperatively requires the possession of the whole adjoining territory of Luxemburg and Lorraine, including the fortifications of Longwy and Verdun, without which this territory cannot be held.

The possession of larger supplies of coal and, in particular, of coal rich in bitumen, which is found in great quantities in the basin of Northern France, is

decisive for the result of the war, at least to as great an extent as is iron ore.

Belgium and North France together produce over forty million tons.[1]

In conclusion, it may be said that the objects which we have in view for the permanent security of our industry are also the objects which guarantee us our military strength, and thereby our political independence and power, quite apart from the fact that, by the extension of our capacity for industrial activity, they increase and secure opportunities for work, and thereby serve to the advantage of the whole of the working classes.

APPENDIX II

GERMANY'S PEACE TERMS

Manifesto of the German Professors[2]

A remarkable programme adopted by a number of German professors and other intellectuals, at a meeting held on June 20, in the Berlin Künstlerhaus, for the purpose of its being presented in petition form to the German Imperial Chancellor, was published in Berne, Switzerland, on August 10. The document is printed off in characters to resemble manuscript. Among the signatories are Friedrich Meinecke, Professor of History, Berlin; Hermann Oncken, Professor of History, Heidelberg; Herr von Reichenau, retired diplomat; Herr von Schwerin,

[1] The German ton is slightly smaller than the English ton; the German ton contains 1,000 kgs., the English ton 1,016 kgs.

[2] This is taken from a version published in America: *Current History* (Oct. 1915).

Regierungs-president, of Frankfurt-am-Main, and Dietrich Schäfer, Professor of History, Berlin.

"The German people and their Emperor have preserved peace for forty-four years, preserved it until its further maintenance was incompatible with national honour and our continued existence. Despite her increase in strength and population, never has Germany thought of transgressing the narrow bounds of her possessions on the European Continent with a view to conquest. Upon the world's markets alone was she forced to make an entry, so as to insure her economic existence by peacefully competing with other nations.

"To our enemies, however, even these narrow limits and a share of the world's trade necessary to our existence seemed too much, and they formed plans which aimed at the very annihilation of the German Empire. Then we Germans rose as one man, from the highest to the meanest, realising that we must defend not only our external life but also our inner, spiritual and moral life—in short, defend German and European civilisation (Kultur) against barbarian hordes from the east, and desire for vengeance and domination from the west. With God's help, hand in hand with our trusty ally, we have been able victoriously to assert ourselves against half a world of enemies.

"Now, however, another foe has arisen, in Italy. It is no longer sufficient for us merely to defend ourselves. Sword in hand, our foes have compelled us to make enormous sacrifices of blood and treasure. Now we want to defend ourselves with all our might against a repetition of such an attack from every side, against a whole succession of wars, and against the possibility of our enemies again becoming strong. Moreover, we are determined to establish ourselves so firmly on such a broad expanse of securely won

homeland that our independent existence is guaranteed for generations to come.

" As to these main objects the nation is unanimous in its determination. The plain truth, for which there is the most absolute foundation, is this. Only one fear exists in all classes of our people, and especially is there a deep-seated fear prevailing among the most simple-minded sections that mistaken ideas of atonement (Versöhnungsillusionen) or even nervous impatience might lead to the conclusion of a premature and consequently patched-up peace, which could never be lasting; and that, as happened a hundred years ago, the pen of the diplomats might ruin what the sword has successfully conquered, and this perhaps in the most fateful hour of German history, when popular feeling has attained an intensity and unanimity which was never known in the past and which will not so easily recur in the future.

" Let there be no mistake. We do not wish to dominate the world, but to have a standing in it fully corresponding to the greatness of our position as a civilised power and our economic and military strength. It may be that owing to the numerical superiority of our enemies we cannot obtain everything we wish in order to insure our position as a nation; but the military results of this war, obtained by such great sacrifices, must be utilised to the very utmost possible extent. This, we repeat, is the firm determination of the German people.

" To give clear expression to this fixed popular determination, and to convey such expression to the Government, to afford it strong support in its difficult task of enforcing Germany's necessary claims against a few faint-hearted individuals at home as well as bitter enemies abroad, is the duty and right of those whose education and position raise them to the level of intellectual leaders and protagonists of public opinion: and we make appeal to them to fulfil this duty.

"Being well aware that a distinction must be drawn between the objects of the war and the final conditions of peace, that everything of necessity depends on the final success of our arms, and that it cannot be our business to discuss Austria-Hungary's and Turkey's military objects, we have drawn up the following brief statement of what, according to our conviction, constitutes for Germany the guarantees of a lasting peace and the goals to which the blood-stained roads of this war must lead.

"1. FRANCE

"After being threatened by France for centuries, and after hearing the cry of vengeance from 1815 till 1870 and from 1871 till 1915, we wish to have done with the French menace once for all. All classes of our people are imbued with this desire. There must, however, be no misplaced attempts at expiation (Versöhnungsbemühungen), which have always been opposed by France with the utmost fanaticism; and as regards this we would utter a most urgent warning to Germans not to deceive themselves. Even after the terrible lesson of this unsuccessful war of vengeance, France will still thirst for revenge, in so far as her strength permits. For the sake of our own existence we must ruthlessly weaken her both politically and economically, and must improve our military and strategical position with regard to her. For this purpose in our opinion it is necessary radically to improve our whole western front from Belfort to the coast. Part of the North French Channel coast we must acquire, if possible, in order to be strategically safer as regards England and to secure better access to the ocean.

"Special measures must be taken to avoid the German Empire in any way suffering internally owing to this enlargement of its frontier and addition to its territory. In order not to have conditions

such as those in Alsace-Lorraine the most important business undertakings and estates must be transferred from anti-German ownership to German hands, France taking over and compensating the former owners. Such portion of the population as is taken over by us must be allowed absolutely no influence in the Empire.

" Furthermore, it is necessary to impose a mercilessly high war indemnity (of which more hereafter) upon France, and probably on her rather than on any other of our enemies, however terrible the financial losses she may have already suffered owing to her own folly and British self-seeking. We must also not forget that she has comparatively large colonial possessions, and that, should circumstances arise, England could hold on to these with impunity if we do not help ourselves to them.

" 2. BELGIUM

" On Belgium, on the acquisition of which so much of the best German blood has been shed, we must keep firm hold, from the political, military, and economic standpoints, despite any arguments which may be urged to the contrary. On no point are the masses more united, for without the slightest possible doubt they consider it a matter of honour to hold on to Belgium.

" From the political and military standpoints it is obvious that, were this not done, Belgium would be neither more nor less than a basis from which England could attack and most dangerously menace Germany, in short, a shield behind which our foes would again assemble against us. Economically Belgium means a prodigious increase of power to us.

" In time also she may entail a considerable addition to our nation, if in course of time the Flemish element, which is so closely allied to us, becomes

because England raised the world against us with gold. It is our duty to crush the insatiable cupidity of this nation. However, we shall probably have to apply for a war indemnity to France in the first place, if not exclusively. We ought not to hesitate to impose upon France as much as possible out of false sentimentalism. As mitigation she might be offered one of the sides of the Suez Canal, while we occupy the other. Should France refuse that, as well as the financial obligation that we should ask her, we should have to impose on her a policy which would satisfy us. We do not want a policy of culture without a policy of action. Germany must insure her political and commercial life before trying to propagate her spirit. Let us at first give a healthy body to our German soul."

The manifesto concludes with this saying of Bismarck:

"'Whenever, in any sphere of politics or elsewhere, one thinks one has touched an obstacle with one's finger, courage and victory no longer stand in the relation of cause to effect, but are identical.'"

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